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A One Way Street to Unconstitutionality:
The "Choose Life" Specialty License Plate
SARAH E. HURST*
The national debate on abortion is taking place in a new forum: specialty license
plates that appear on motor vehicles. Under some state statutes, individuals may
select a special license plate format that includes the message, "Choose Life,"
by paying an extra fee. Further, the funds generated from those who select such
a license plate format are entrusted to groups, such as Catholic Charities, that
refuse to counsel abortion as an option for responding to an unwanted
pregnancy. Not surprisingly, pro-choice advocates and organizations have
argued that the statutes authorizing this practice are unconstitutional. This
argument is correct to the extent that those who challenge the constitutionality of
this policy base their challenges on the Establishment Clause and the free speech
clause of the First Amendment. The state practice violates all three of the tests
the Supreme Court has applied in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence: the
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test. Moreover, these statutes
violate the free speech clause by engaging in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. Finally, this note concludes that the statement, "Choose Life,"
should not appear on license plates at all, because an alternative forum exists for
those who wish to express their views on abortion on their motor vehicles,
namely, bumper stickers.
"['Choose Life' is] a very innocuous statement that most
people will agree with."
"['Choose Life' license plates] provide a way for the antichoice movement to
spread propaganda with the help of the government." 2
"Related by antithesis, / A compromise between us is / Impossible." 3
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I Sharon Lemer, A New Kind of Abortion War, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 1, 2002, at 48
(quoting Florida Governor Jeb Bush).
2 Alan Fisk, Abortion Fight Takes to the Highways, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 24, 2001, at A4
(quoting Simon Heller of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy in New York).
3 W.H. AUDEN, COLLECTED SHORTER POEMS 1927-1957, at 222 (1966).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Roe v. Wade4 established that a woman had a fundamental right to
terminate her pregnancy and that regulations restricting access to abortion must be
justified by a "compelling state interest,"5 intensifying the national debate
regarding the constitutionality of abortion. Although Planned Parenthood v.
Casey/ later reaffirmed that a woman has a right to have an abortion before
viability without undue influence from the state, 7 the case also emphasized the
importance of a state's interest in the life of the fetus.8 Now, thirty years since
Roe, automobile license plates are the latest location of the struggle to protect and
promote both the judicially recognized importance of potential life and a
woman's constitutional right to choose to have an abortion.9 While other
4 410 U.S. 113(1973).
5 Id. at 152-56 (stating that the constitutional right to privacy encompassed a woman's
right to choose an abortion and that although this fundamental right was not unqualified, it may
only be restricted by a compelling state interest).
6 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
7 Id. at 846 (reaffirming what the Casey plurality believed to be Roe's three-part "essential
holding": (1) "recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State"; (2) "confirmation of the
State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability," with exceptions for the mother's health
or life; and (3) "the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus").
8 Id. at 871-73 (rejecting Roe's trimester framework governing restrictions on abortions
because that framework failed to provide adequate protection to the state's significant interest in
potential life). Significantly, instead of utilizing (as Roe did) a strict scrutiny standard to
determine whether a restriction on abortion was permissible, the Casey plurality determined that
the proper way to acknowledge and protect the state's substantial interest in the life of the fetus
was to analyze abortion restriction under an "undue burden" standard. Id. at 876-77. This
"undue burden" standard safeguards the state's interest in potential life by permitting constraints
on the right to terminate a pregnancy so long as the regulation does not have "the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus." Id.
9 Over one thousand newspaper articles have reported on this nationwide abortion debate
in the context of automobile license plates since 1997. See, e.g., Alabama Abortion Foes Win
OK for 'Life' License Plate, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct. 24, 2001, at A5
("Legislatures in Florida, South Carolina and Louisiana have approved 'Choose Life' license
plates. All are being challenged in court, and Florida's tag is the only one that has appeared on
cars."); Howard Kleinberg, Ideological Collisions Better Left off the Road, TAMPA TRIB., Sept.
28, 1997, at 6 ("We've got enough to be irritated about on the highway without having to deal
[with] ... an issue as sensitive and divisive as abortion [on a license plate]."); Brett Martel,
'Choose Life' Plate Raises Ire in La., COM. APPEAL (Memphis), July 24, 2000, at A6
(responding to the pro-life plates, "[t]he ACLU is now considering legal action to remove
[state] lawmakers' authority to approve specialty license plates altogether."); Waldo Proffitt,
'Choose Life' Tag Like Pouring Gasoline on a Raging Fire, SARASOTA HERALD-TRiB., Mar.
11, 1999, at 16A ("The state simply has no business taking sides in what may well be the most
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messages on license plates previously caused constitutional challenges, 10 the
current dispute on whether to permit abortion-related statements on license plates
generates significant television and radio coverage" of the public outcry on both
sides and the resulting political quandary for many state legislators on how to
proceed.
This ongoing license plate debate focuses on pro-life organizations' efforts to
display an anti-abortion message, such as "Choose Life,"' 2 on "specialty" license
intractable dispute in the country."); Right to Choose a Veto, SARASOTA HERALD-TRDB., May
23, 1998, at 18A ("Politically loaded slogans-whether 'Pro-Choice' or 'Choose Life'-belong
on bumper stickers, not government sanctioned license plates.").
10 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 715-17 (1977) (holding that state
residents' free speech rights were violated when New Hampshire enforced criminal sanctions
against persons who covered up the state motto "Live Free or Die" on passenger license plates
because the persons found the message morally objectionable); Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946-47 (W.D. Va. 2001) (finding that Virginia
impermissibly engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it banned an organization's
Confederate flag logo on its specialized license plate); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1104-05 (D. Md. 1997) (enjoining state officials from recalling
or failing to issue a group's Confederate flag logo on its specialized license plates because
doing so would violate the First Amendment right of free speech).
" Since 1997, over 1200 television and radio programs, local and national, have reported
on the developing license plate controversy. See, e.g., Eyewitness News (WSOC-TV television
broadcast, Nov. 20, 2001) ("A Federal Judge in Charleston has barred South Carolina from
producing Choose Life license plates."); All Things Considered-NPR (National Public Radio
broadcast, Aug. 20, 2001) ('This year, sixteen states considered some kind of specialty license
plates with an anti-abortion message."); Politically Incorrect (ABC television broadcast, July
26, 2000) ("The Louisiana Legislature adopted pro-life license plates.... People do kill others
over this [abortion] issue."); NPR Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 30,
1998) (NPR guest Kate Michaelman commenting: "For the state to take a position on one side
over another [in the abortion issue], and even earn money on it... [aimed at] supporting anti-
choice activities, is extraordinary."); 7 News Weekend (WSVN-TV television broadcast, Feb.
15, 1997) ("[An automobile license t]ag which would feature two kids with the word[s] choose
life underneath is coming under fire.").
Recent law review articles have also examined the issue. See, e.g., Jeremy T. Berry,
Comment, Licensing a Choice: "Choose Life" Specialty License Plates and Their
Constitutional Implications, 51 EMORY L.J. 1605 (2002).
12 See, e.g., Alabama Abortion Foes, supra note 9 (stating that several state legislatures
have approved "Choose Life" license plates); Fisk, supra note 2 (noting that a couple of states
have passed laws issuing a "Choose Life" license plate and that other states also considered
doing the same); Group Opposes "Choose Life" Plates, ADVOCATE, Sept. 7, 2001, at 8-A,
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All (reporting that the South Carolina legislature had
approved "Choose Life" license plates); Anti-Abortion Plates Get OK in Alabama, RECORDER,
Oct. 25, 2001, at 9 (noting that some state legislatures have approved "Choose Life" license
plates).
According to Choose Life, Inc., at least forty-three states have pro-life specialty license
plate efforts in progress including: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
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plates.' 3 Particularly controversial about this issue is that the proceeds generated
from the pro-life plates may only go to organizations that do not offer or discuss
abortion as an option for women who are uncertain on how to proceed with an
unintended pregnancy. 14
Pro-choice groups object to the production of these plates, claiming, in
general, that state statutes authorizing the anti-abortion license plates are
unconstitutional under the First Amendment Establishment Clause by
impermissibly delegating governmental functions to Christian fundamentalist
organizations that decide how to distribute the license plate proceeds. 15 In
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Other States .... Choose Life, Inc., at
http://www.choose-life.org/states.php (last visited May 24, 2003). Choose Life, Inc. is an
organization created for the purpose of creating "a specialty license plate with the slogan
'Choose Life' whose proceeds would be used to facilitate and encourage adoption as a positive
choice for women with unplanned pregnancies." About Us >> Purpose, Choose Life, Inc., at
http://www.choose-life.org/purpose.html (last visited May 24, 2003).
13 Specialty license plates, also known as "specialized" license plates or "prestige plates,"
are distinct from "vanity plates": "Vanity plates are where a state will customize the
arrangement of letter [sic] and numbers to create a plate for one individual and it cannot be
duplicated. A prestige plate o[r] specialty plate is where a license plate is created to refer to a
specific group like the Shriners or a school." Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 597
n.5 (E.D. La. 2000) (emphasis added), rev'd, vacated, and remanded by 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.
2002). Thus, having a license plate that displays a school name and/or school logo such as "The
Ohio State University" with a buckeye in the background of the plate is a specialty license plate.
On the other hand, a plate whose actual numbers or letters spell out a phrase such as "RICH
DOC I" is a vanity license plate. Several people may purchase the former plate, while only one
person may have the latter. Id.
14 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.08058(30)(b) (West 2001) (stating that the annual
plate fees shall go to organizations whose "services are limited to counseling and meeting the
physical needs of pregnant women who are committed to placing their children [up] for
adoption. Funds may not be distributed to any agency that is involved or associated with
abortion activities."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61(F)(2) (West 2001). The Louisiana
statute provides that in order for an organization to receive plate funds it must
demonstrate [that] it provides counseling and other services intended to meet the needs of
expectant mothers considering adoption for their unborn child. No monies deposited into
the fund shall be distributed to any organization involved in, or associated with counseling
for, or referrals to, abortion clinics, providing medical abortion-related procedures, or pro-
abortion advertising.
Id.; S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910(B) (Law. Co-op. 200:2) (requiring that pro-life license plate
monies "may not be awarded to any agency, institution, or organization that provides,
promotes, or refers for abortion").
15 See, e.g., Women's Emergency Network v. Bu;h, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1361 (S.D.
Fla. 2002) (noting that the pro-choice plaintiffs "raised an as applied challenge to the Counties'
alleged delegation of their distribution responsibilities [of funds generated by pro-life plates] to
[Vol. 64:957
A ONE WAY STREET TO UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
addition, pro-choice advocates contend that these statutes also violate the Free
Speech Clause because the laws discriminate on the basis of viewpoint by only
presenting one side of the abortion debate.16 Anti-abortion groups, on the other
hand, respond with several arguments, including: (1) that the plate funds go to
adoption agencies and not to religious organizations;' 7 (2) that pro-choice
advocates are not compelled to purchase the anti-abortion plates;' 8 (3) that in a
state where pro-choice groups could not show that they petitioned for their own
plate and were rejected, the pro-choice groups could not establish they had
suffered a direct injury to their First Amendment free speech rights;' 9 and (4) that
pro-choice advocates lack standing to challenge state statutes authorizing pro-life
plates.20 Decisions and restrictions have gone in favor of both groups in the two
states presented with these conflicting arguments in litigation.2'
This note examines these claims of alleged Establishment Clause and free
speech rights and violations in the context of specialty license plates that espouse
Catholic organizations," violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause); Henderson,
112 F. Supp. 2d at 592-93 (stating pro-choice plaintiffs' argument that by delegating
"governmental functions [the power to distribute license plate funds] to Christian
fundamentalist organizations and that... the Act places the State's imprimatur on
fundamentalist Christian beliefs and that the statute thus violates the Establishment Clause");
Rosaland Briggs Gammon, Florida Officials Sued over State's Anti-Abortion Auto Tags,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 23, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Bloomberg-All Bloomberg News
File (reporting that a recent lawsuit filed against Florida Governor Jeb Bush and other officials
"contends that the state violates the U.S. Constitution by allowing religious organizations that
receive plate proceeds to distribute those funds to other anti-abortion groups").
16 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564, 566 (D.S.C. 2002) (noting
that pro-choice plaintiffs allege that the statute "infringes the First Amendment by
discriminating on the basis of viewpoint"); Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (noting that pro-
choice plaintiffs argued a First Amendment violation because only the "pro-life viewpoint [may
be] expressed via special license plates and pro-choice car owners are not given the option of
expressing their view on their license plates") (citation omitted); Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-
583-CIV-J-21 -A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999) (stating that
pro-choice plaintiffs asserted the statute discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by only
presenting one opinion about the abortion debate and therefore acted contrary to the First
Amendment).
17 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
18 Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at "12.
19 Id.
20 Women's Emergency Network, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
21 Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (holding that plaintiffs had standing and that the statute
authorizing the "Choose Life" plate was unconstitutional); Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 601-
02 (finding pro-choice plaintiffs' free speech had been abridged and issuing an injunction to
halt production of "Choose Life" specialty license plates), rev 'd, vacated, and remanded by 287
F.3d 374, 382 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the pro-choice "plaintiffs in this case have not
shown that they have standing to challenge the constitutionality" of the pro-life license plate
statute); Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *21 (rejecting pro-choice plaintiffs' First
Amendment claims, permitting production of pro-life plates).
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a position regarding abortion. Part Hl presents a background of free speech
precedent regarding license plates and abortion rights. In addition, this section
provides an overview of recent free speech challenges against the "Choose Life"
license plates. Next, Part 11m considers the Establishment Clause arguments
regarding both how the funds are distributed and who distributes those funds to
pro-life groups; this section also examines the language itself printed on the plate.
Finally, Part IV contends that, in light of both the foregoing free speech and
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, license plates cannot display the "Choose
Life" message. This note also concludes that the abortion subject matter should
not appear at all on specialty license plates, particularly because bumper stickers
provide a sufficient alternative means of expression.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE
Pro-choice advocates contend that the "Choose Life" plates22 violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... "23 Since its promulgation, however, this statement by the Framers
appears vague, especially in its failure to define the meaning of "establishment." 24
22 The Florida pro-life plate is a school-bus-yellow plate with child-like sketches [also
described as "crayon-style drawings"] of a smiling boy and girl and the words "Choose Life."
Jim Tunstall, Abortion Foes Seek Special Tag, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 11, 1997, at 1; Choose Life
Plate on Holdfor Challenge, STUART NEWS/PORT ST. LUCiE NEWS, Dec. 11, 1999, at B5. The
Louisiana design, on the other hand, portrays the words "Choose Life" with "a picture of a baby
wrapped in a blanket in the beak of a brown pelican, the state bird." Joe Gyan, Jr., Louisiana to
Appeal Ruling on "Choose Life" License Plate, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 3, 2000, at 7-
B, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All. For a pictorial list of other potential state
plates, see http://www.choose-life.org/states.php (last visited May 24, 2003).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
24 See, e.g., Ashley M. Bell, Comment, "God Save This Honorable Court ": How Current
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical
Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2001). In this article, the author notes
that "[t]he Framers were not clear in their attempt to explain the proper role of religion in the
public realm." Id. The article also observes that other scholars have stated that "[t]he history of
the drafting of the Establishment Clause does not provide us with an understanding of what was
meant by 'an establishment of religion.'" 1d. at 1275 n.8 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 102-05 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 2d ed. 1994)); see also Rena
M. Bila, Note, The Establishment Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for Religion in
Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1995) ("Despite the articulated mandates in
the First Amendment, little consensus exists on the constitutional parameters of the religion
clauses, particularly the Establishment Clause."); cf Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the Juice from
Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the Establishment Clause, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 621, 621-
22 (1995) (observing that Supreme Court Justices have fashioned different theories for applying
the Establishment Clause); Kristin J. Graham, Comment, The Supreme Court Comes Full
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A. General Background of the Establishment Clause
Lacking clear guidance from the Framers, the Supreme Court has not
consistently applied the same Establishment Clause analysis throughout the years,
confusing lower courts and leading to inconsistent decisions. 25 The three main
tests that the Supreme Court employs to determine whether there has been an
Establishment Clause violation include: (1) the Lemon test; (2) the endorsement
test; and (3) the coercion test.26
This first test, however, articulated as a three-step analysis by the Supreme
Court in the 1971 case Lemon v. Kurtzman,27 persists as the Court's primary
test.28 Under the Lemon inquiry, the statute in question must meet the following
criteria 29 if it is to survive: (1) it must have a secular legislative purpose;30 (2) its
Circle: Coercion as the Touchstone of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BuFF. L. REV.
147, 148 (1994) (noting that the United States Supreme Court, charged with the duty of
interpreting the Establishment Clause over the last two hundred years, has not created an
enduring framework or Establishment Clause test).
25 See, e.g., Thomas R. Hensley & G.R. Jarrod Tudor, An Analysis of the Rehnquist
Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: A New Marriage of Legal and Social Science
Approaches, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 869, 909 (noting that Supreme Court
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has left the lower courts "with little clear guidance");
Theologos Verginis, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board: Is There Salvation
for the Establishment Clause? "With God All Things Are Possible ", 34 AKRON L. REv. 741,
742 (2001) ("Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been in a disconcerting state. Much of the
chaos has centered around the Supreme Court's unwillingness to adhere to one doctrinal
perspective."); Joel Brady, Comment, "Land Is Itself a Sacred, Living Being": Native
American Sacred Site Protection on Federal Public Lands Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge,
24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 163 (1999/2000) ("The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has not been clear. Much of the confusion is due to the fact that the Court has
employed different tests, while never explicitly overruling previous tests."); Rebecca E.
Lawrence, Comment, The Future of School Vouchers in Light of the Past Chaos of the
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 419, 442 (2001) ("The Supreme
Court's shift in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence has left lower courts in a state of
confusion.").
26 See, e.g., Jeanne Anderson, The Revolution Against Evolution, or "Well, Darwin, We 're
Not in Kansas Anymore", 29 J.L. & EDUC. 398, 399-401 (2000) (noting these are the three
principal tests used by the Supreme Court); Deborah A. Reule, Note, The New Face of
Creationism: The Establishment Clause and the Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in Public
Schools, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2555, 2565-68 (2001) (describing these three main tests). See also
infra Part IV.A.3 for more discussion regarding all of these tests.
27 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
28 See infra note 35 and accompanying text for law indicating that the Lemon test is still
valid.
29 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (describing the three elements).
30 For cases discussing what has not constituted a secular purpose, see Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987) (declaring unconstitutional a state law that required
public schools to teach "creation science .... because the primary purpose of the Creationism
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principal effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;31 and (3)
the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.32
Although criticized33 and ostensibly modified,34 the Court has not yet explicitly
overruled this test.35
Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine, ... [thus] further[ing] religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (finding
unconstitutional a Kentucky statute that required the Ten Commandments be posted on the wall
of each public school classroom because the statute did not serve a secular purpose); and
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (rejecting the argument that the
reading of Bible verses in public schools served the secular purpose of the "promotion of moral
values" in children).
31 See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (permitting an exemption for religious organizations
from employment discrimination under Title VII because there was no evidence that "the
government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence"); Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (declaring that a state statute that provides
Sabbath observers the right not to work on their Sabbath "has a primary effect that
impermissibly advances a particular religious practice," thus violating the Establishment
Clause).
32 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95
(1993) (permitting the presentation of a film series regarding Christian family issues because
the showing would "not foster an excessive entanglement with religion"); Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394-95 (1990) (holding that the state's
"imposition of sales and use tax liability on [the religious organization] threatens no excessive
entanglement between church and state").
33 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
34 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997); see also Michael A. Vaccari, Public
Purpose and the Public Funding of Sectarian Educational Institutions: A More Rational
Approach After Rosenberger and Agostini, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 38 (1998) ("Agostini
substantially reworked the second prong of the Lemon test and eliminated the third prong as a
separate test."); Jeremy T. Bunnow, Note, Reinventing the Lemon: Agostini v. Felton and the
Changing Nature of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1133, 1133
(noting that Agostini "created a 'significant change' in Establishment Clause jurisprudence");
David S. Petron, Note, Finding Direction in Indirection: The Direct/Indirect Aid Distinction in
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1233, 1244-45 (2000) (stating
that Agostini modified the Lemon test and that it changed "the criteria used to assess whether
aid to religion has an impermissible effect") (citation omitted).
35 For sources noting that the Lemon test has not been overruled and is still good law, see
James E.M. Craig, Comment, "In God We Trust, " Unless We Are a Public Elementary School:
Making a Case for Extending Equal Access to Elementary Education, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 529,
536-37 (2000); Robert L. Kilroy, Note, A Lost Opportunity to Sweeten the Lemon of
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701, 702 (1997); Devon M. Lehman,
Comment, The Godless Graduation Ceremony?: The State of Student-Initiated Graduation
Prayer After Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 72 U. COLO. L.
REv. 175, 179-80(2001).
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B. Previous Application of the Lemon Test to Pro-Life License Plates and
the Distribution of Plate Funds
In the states passing legislation permitting the production of pro-life license
plates,36 only organizations that do not mention or counsel abortion as an option
are eligible for the funds generated from the sale of the plates.37 Therefore, groups
such as Planned Parenthood, which counsel about and provide abortion
services, 38 are denied the opportunity to apply for these funds. 39 Because they are
ineligible for the funds, these organizations have filed complaints on the
distribution issue.40 These pro-choice groups allege that the distribution of plate
36 The states all have basic requirements that must be followed when applying for a
specialty license plate. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative
Discretion: The Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REv. 419, 425 (2001). These
requirements may include signatures of a certain number of vehicle owners who plan to
purchase the proposed plate, an application fee of up to $60,000 to defray state's expenses,
marketing plans, and financial analysis of anticipated revenue. Id. The states have various
requirements for specialty license plates. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.08053 (West 2001); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000 (Law. Co-op. 2000).
37 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The Florida statute, for example, allows each
county to administer the money it raises. Mark Hollis, Judge Dismisses Choose Life Suit;
Attorney to Go to High Court, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 22, 2001, at 6B.
Approximately 25,000 pro-life plates were sold in Florida in 2001, placing that plate as the
thirteenth most popular out of fifty-three other specialty plates. Drew Dixon, 'Choose Life'
License Money to Be Distributed, STUART NEWS/PORT ST. LuCIE NEWS, Jan. 8, 2002, at C2.
About $20.00 per plate may go to eligible organizations. Hollis, supra. As a result of the high
sales, the funds generated from the sale of pro-life plates over one year in Florida are
significant: $682,674 in revenue. Gammon, supra note 15.
38 Planned Parenthood's website offers detailed information designed to educate women
considering abortion as an option to an unwanted pregnancy, Abortion: Choosing Abortion:
Questions & Answers, Planned Parenthood, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
ABORTION/chooseabortl.html (last visited May 24, 2003). For example, a link at this site
explains the basics about surgical abortions, including steps to take prior to obtaining a surgical
abortion (such as counseling), special arrangements that may need to be made, and a general
description of the three most common methods of surgical abortion: manual vacuum aspiration,
dilation and suction curettage, and dilation and evacuation. Abortion: Surgical Abortion-
Questions & Answers, Planned Parenthood, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
ABORTION/surgabort l.html (last visited May 24, 2003).
39 See supra note 14.
40 See, e.g., Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. La. 2000), rev'd, vacated,
and remanded by 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002) (considering whether the state delegated
governmental functions to religious organizations when it permitted said organizations to
distribute funds generated from the sale of pro-life plates). In addition, a pro-choice plaintiff
(Florida National Organization for Women) filed suit in a Florida state court contesting the
distribution of funds to religious organizations. Hollis, supra note 37. Although that case was
dismissed in November 2001, the plaintiff plans to appeal the decision. Id.
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funds targeted to religious groups opposing abortion violates the Establishment
Clause.41
1. Henderson v. Stalder42
Demonstrating that language such as "Choose Life" on a pro-life specialty
plate violates all three of the Lemon elements has so far proven a formidable
battle for pro-choice advocates. In Henderson I, for instance, the disputed
Louisiana statute provided that revenue generated from the anti-abortion specialty
plates would be distributed by the State Treasurer upon the recommendation of a
"Choose Life" Advisory Council, composed of the American Family Association,
the Louisiana Family Forum, and the Concerned Women of America.43 The
generated funds were to go to organizations that counsel pregnant women to place
their children up for adoption and not to any organization that "is involved in or
associated with abortion clinics or pro-abortion advertising." 44 The pro-choice
plaintiffs contended that, as a result of these provisions, the statute "delegates
governmental functions to Christian fundamentalist organizations and that the
three council members subscribe to and actively promote Christian
fundamentalist beliefs as set forth in their organization's mission statements," thus
violating the Establishment Clause.45
The Louisiana district court ultimately rejected plaintiffs' argument.46 First, it
noted that the statute served an established secular purpose already recognized by
the courts: dealing with unwanted pregnancies.47 Second, plaintiffs' argument did
not persuade the court that the statute had the primary effect of advancing a
particular religion.48 Indeed, the court noted, "there is no proof that any of the
three groups [composing the council that directs distribution of funds] would
constitute a religious institution for the purpose of this analysis."49 Moreover, in
issuing funds to different groups, the court determined that no preference was
made for sectarian groups to receive the license plate money.50 Finally, the
41 Hollis, supra note 37.
42 112 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. La. 2000) ("Henderson 1"), rev'd, vacated, and remanded by
287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Henderson If'), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 602 (2002). Henderson
II is not relevant to this Establishment Clause discussion. The injunction entered by the district
court that Henderson II reversed was based primarily on a free speech challenge, addressed in
infra Section III.
43 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 593.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 593-94.
48 1d. at 594.
49 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
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possibility that advancing religion may be an incidental effect of the statute was
not enough for the court to invalidate it under the Establishment Clause.
5
'
The Fifth Circuit, too, rejected plaintiffs' Establishment Clause argument,
finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the "Choose
Life" plates.52 The court did not find that plaintiffs suffered a concrete and
particularized injury because no evidence demonstrated that Choose Life Council
members who distribute the plate funds "have actually advanced the religious
ideologies of their respective organizations or religion in general. '53 Moreover,
the "Choose Life" statute contradicted plaintiffs' argument that state income tax
dollars were used for the Choose Life Council or the Choose Life Fund
administration. 54 As a result, plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the statute on
the basis of the Establishment Clause.55
2. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush56
In a Florida federal court, the Women's Emergency Network and Emergency
Medical Assistance, Inc., both pro-choice organizations,57 challenged Florida's
alleged delegation of plate fund distribution to a Catholic organization.58 The pro-
choice plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
prohibiting distribution of the pro-life plate monies.59 The plaintiffs claimed that
permitting a Roman Catholic organization to distribute state funds generated from
license plate sales violates the Establishment Clause.60
51 Id. at 594-95.
52 Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 379-81 (5th Cir. 2002). The court stated that both
the individual and the state plaintiffs lacked standing. Id.
53 Id. at 380.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 191 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2002). On July 12, 2002, the court determined that
Governor Bush was not a proper party to this lawsuit, granting his motion to dismiss. Women's
Emergency Network v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2002). Thus, the case name
became Women's Emergency Network v. Dickinson, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
57 Both the Women's Emergency Network and Emergency Medical Assistance, Inc. are
listed members of the National Network of Abortion Funds ("NNAF") eligible for abortion
funds. See NNAF, at http:www.nnaforg/perl/xioutput.cgi?output--record&config =
publicmemout&getrecord=state:FL (last visited May 24, 2003) (listing fund members in
Florida).
58 Women's Emergency Network, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1361-62.
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In February 2002, the district court, while not considering the plaintiffs' as-
applied and facial challenges because they lacked standing,61 denied plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction barring distribution of the funds. 62
Later, in July 2002, the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked taxpayer
standing and rejected their substantive Establishment Clause challenges.63
According to the court, the individual plaintiffs (lid not have taxpayer standing to
challenge the "Choose Life" statute because they failed to demonstrate that
county funds were used to distribute the Choose Life funds. 64 Indeed, the court
noted that the statute's express language provided that the plate funds would be
used for distribution costs. 65
In addition, the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that any agency distributing
the funds would advance a religious ideology.66 Satisfied that Catholic Charities
distributed a particular county's funds "equally among all qualified agencies," the
court noted that the plaintiffs failed to establish that "any regard has been given to
religious affiliation. '67 As a result, the plaintiffs did not establish an actual injury
and thus lacked standing.68
C. Establishment Clause Challenge Based on Pro-Life Religious Message
In addition to Establishment Clause challenges directed at the manner in
which funds are distributed, critics also denounced the "Choose Life" message
itself as religious. Pro-choice advocates in Florida, for example, filed a lawsuit in
late 1999 seeking to stop issuance of the plates based on the plates' pro-life
message. 69 In that case, the plaintiffs asserted that the phrase "Choose Life" was
derived from70 the Old Testament book of Deuteronomy, blurring the boundary
61 Women's Emergency Network, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 ("Because the Court has
concluded that it cannot enter the injunction requested by [pro-choice] Plaintiffs [enjoining
production of the license plates] ... it would be premature to consider the Plaintiffs' as-applied
and facial challenges of the Act at this time.").
62 Id.
63 Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2002). The
court also rejected plaintiffs' challenges based on free speech violations. Id. at 1313-15. For a
discussion of that issue, see infra Part l1I.A.
64 Women's Emergency Network, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Cristin Kellogg, Pro-Life Floridians Fight for Right to Drive Home a Point;
NOW Stalls 'Choose Life' Plates, WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 2000, at A2; Nancy L. Othon,
Challenge to 'Choose Life' Tags Is Based on Issues of Religion, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Nov. 25, 1999, at I B.
70 Hollis, supra note 37.
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between church and state:71 "I have set before you life and death, blessing and
cursing. Therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live.. ..- 72
Moreover, plaintiffs contended, "Choose Life" is a slogan associated with the
anti-abortion movement.73 Ultimately, these arguments failed to persuade the
circuit court, which dismissed the complaint in November 2001, holding that
"[n]o facts are alleged to support the conclusory assertions of excessive
government entanglement with religion."74
Im. THE FREE SPEECH CHALLENGE
Although "Choose Life" opponents alleged Establishment Clause75 (and
Equal Protection 76) violations to prevent production of the plates, the First
71 Sara Rimensnyder, Plate Debate: Political Motorists, REASON, Jan. 1,2002, at 14.
72 Deuteronomy 30:19 (King James) (emphasis added).
73 Kellogg, supra note 69; Othon, supra note 69.
74 Jim Ash, Judge: 'Choose Life' Plate Doesn't Break Law on Religion, PALM BEACH
POST, Nov. 22, 2001, at 3B. The attorney for the plaintiffs in that case, Barry Silver, plans to
appeal that decision, hoping the First District Court of Appeals will bump his appeal directly to
the Florida Supreme Court to decide. Id.
75 See supra Section II.
76 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D.S.C. 2002). The Equal
Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. The plaintiffs in Rose alleged, for example, that enforcement of a state statute authorizing
the production of pro-life plates presented a violation of this clause. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at
566. Similar to a previous statute enacted in Florida, the South Carolina act specifically
provided that the funds generated from the sale of these plates may not be disbursed to "any
agency, institution, or organization" that "provides, promotes or refers for abortion."
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Rose, (D.S.C.
filed Oct. 18, 2001) (No. 2-01-3571-23). In addition, the disputed statute did not provide for a
pro-choice plate that would generate similar funds for which Planned Parenthood would be
eligible. Id. at 3. As a result of Planned Parenthood's disqualification from funds generated by
plates addressing the abortion issue, plaintiffs alleged that the statute penalized them for
exercising their constitutional rights. Id. at 2-3. Further, the plaintiffs noted that "government
may not deny eligibility for a benefit where the reason for the denial is tied to the exercise of
constitutional rights." Id. at 12. "[B]y disqualifying [Planned Parenthood] from eligibility for
grants ... because it provides abortion, the Act violates the rights of [Planned Parenthood's]
patients to choose abortion" and thus operates as "an unconstitutional penalty." Id. at 12-13.
The District Court of South Carolina did not rule on the merits of this argument because
the statute was found unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. This equal protection
argument, however, appears unlikely to be successful in future cases if raised in light of past
United States Supreme Court precedent permitting the government to provide funds to clinics
that do not provide or refer abortions. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991)
('he Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.").
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Amendment free speech claim has emerged as the most successful challenge to
date in a district court in prohibiting anti-abortion messages from appearing on
specialty license plates.77
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment guarantees that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech. '78 Justice Cardozo
previously described this freedom of speech as "the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a pervasive recognition
of that truth can be traced in our history, political and legal." 79 Despite this strong
tradition of protecting speech, however, the First Amendment does not guarantee
an absolute right to speak regardless of the context and content of the speech.80
Finally, state regulation of speech, in any type of forum, must be viewpoint
neutral.8'
77 See, e.g., Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 572, 574 (finding statute permitting "Choose Life"
license plate was unconstitutional because it constituted viewpoint discrimination).
78 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The right of free speech is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) ("For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.").
79 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
80 See, e.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (noting that "the First Amendment while
prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have been, and obviously was not,
intended to give immunity for every possible use of language"); Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454,462 (1907).
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press
which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish,
without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of
those who abuse this freedom.
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666; see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
81 "[Tlhe prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose of the
Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate." Rosenberger
v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). For a discussion of what is
viewpoint neutrality or viewpoint discrimination, see, for example, Board of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) ("The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that
minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views."); Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 894 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Other things being equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs
when government allows one message while prohibiting the messages of those who can
reasonably be expected to respond."); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-
86 (1978) ("Especially where ... the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to
give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people,
the First Amendment is plainly offended.").
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A. The Abortion/Free Speech Debate in Other Distinct Venues
Automobile license plates were not the first context where the abortion
debate and First Amendment rights collided. Sidewalks and areas outside of
abortion clinics, for example, raised free speech issues when increasing violence
and blockades directed against abortion offices in the early 1990s prompted the
enactment of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (hereinafter
"FACE" or "the Act"). 82 FACE prohibited any person from using force or the
threat of force or physical obstruction intentionally to injure (or attempt to injure),
to intimidate, or to interfere with any person because that person is or has been
obtaining or providing reproductive health services. 83 Subsequent to its
enactment, abortion protesters opposed FACE, asserting that the Act violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because it restricted pro-life
activists' freedom of expression and unlawfully constrained the expression based
on its viewpoint.84 Courts presented with these First Amendment challenges have
82 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2001); see, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.
1998) (stating that Congress enacted FACE to deal with increasing violence surrounding clinics
that offered abortion services). After the shooting of two abortion doctors just outside of their
clinics in 1993, the Senate and House passed the bills that later became FACE. Katherine A.
Hilber, Note, Constitutional Face-Off" Testing the Validity of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 143, 162-63 (1994) (noting the fatal shooting of
abortion doctor David Gunn in March 1993, the shooting of abortion doctor George Tiller, and
that the Senate passed the bill by a vote of sixty-nine to thirty and by a voice vote in the House).
Numerous articles describe the escalating violence outside of abortion clinics by pro-life
extremists in the early 1990s that prompted FACE. See Abortion Protester Held in Doctor's
Murder at Clinic, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al; Doctor Slain During Abortion Clinic
Protest, CHI. TPB., Mar. 11, 1993, at 2; Barbara Mulhem, Both Abortion Sides Here Denounce
Slaying, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Mar. 11, 1993, at IA; Larry Rohter, Abortion Foe Kills
Doctor Outside of Clinic in Florida, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 11, 1993, at IA; Dr. Tony
Smith, Health: Second Opinion, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 5, 1993, at 85.
Abortion is becoming more difficult for American women.... Clinics are shutting
because they are being bombed, picketed, blockaded, and burnt. According to the Lancet,
up to the end of September 1993 there had been 1,417 acts of violence against family
planning and abortion clinics and their staff-including 36 bombings, 289 bomb threats,
149 death threats and two kidnappings.
Id.
83 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (2001). FACE also prohibits the intentional damage or
destruction of a reproductive health facility. § 248(a)(3). Criminal and civil penalties and relief
resulting from violations include imprisonment, monetary damages, and injunctive relief where
appropriate. § 248(b), (c).
84 See, e.g., Wilson, 154 F.3d at 662 (noting that pro-life activists who physically
blockaded an abortion clinic in violation of FACE argued that the Act "restricts their freedom
of expression and imposes an impermissible viewpoint based restriction on speech"); United
States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 917, 921 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that an anti-abortion activist
who shouted through a bullhorn at an abortion doctor, "remember Dr. Gunn [a physician who
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generally rejected them, deciding instead that FACE regulates speech that is not
constitutionally protected and that the Act is a content and viewpoint-neutral
statute. 85 Thus, while pro-life activists may not use force, threaten to use force, or
physically block reproductive health clinic entrances, they still may express their
views by peacefully picketing around centers that offer abortion, and may engage
in nonviolent "sidewalk counseling" to discourage pregnant women from
obtaining abortions.86
In addition to sidewalks and areas surrounding an abortion clinic, Planned
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists87 demonstrated how the
Intemet has also been a source of free speech debate regarding abortion in the last
few years. In that case, Planned Parenthood sued the American Coalition of Life
Activists organization ("ACLA"), in part, for displaying on ACLA's website
was killed in 1993 by an opponent of abortion]," argued that FACE imposed "an impermissible
content-based restriction on speech, and that it is vague and overbroad"); Council for Life
Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1426-27 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that a pro-life
organization sought to enjoin the enactment of FACE because the Act restricted the freedom of
expression and association protected by the First Amendment because it "singles out for special
punishment acts committed in the course of anti-abortion protests").
85 See, e.g., Wilson, 154 F.3d at 662-63 (finding that use of force, threat of use of force,
and physical obstruction are not protected speech and that the Act is viewpoint neutral because
it "punishes anyone who engages in the prohibited conduct, irrespective of the person's
viewpoint and does not target any message based on content"); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575,
588 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the regulation of "speech that amounts to a threat of force that
obstructs, injures, intimidates, or interferes with the provider or recipient of reproductive health
care" does not violate the First Amendment); Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 922-23. The Dinwiddie
court concluded that threats of force were not protected :,peech and that FACE is not a content-
based statute because it does not discriminate against speech or conduct that expresses an
abortion-related message. "Thus, FACE would prohibit striking employees from obstructing
access to a clinic in order to stop women from getting abortions, even if the workers were
carrying signs that said, 'We are underpaid!' rather than 'Abortion is wrong!'" Id; see also
Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 648-50 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the use of
force or violence is not protected by the First Amendment); Council for Life Coalition, 856 F.
Supp. at 1427 (determining that the Act applies to "any person" who engages in the prohibited
conduct, not just pro-life activists, and that Congress enacted FACE to forbid violent conduct
rather than to curb an anti-abortion message).
86 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 773-74 (1994) (finding that a 300-foot
buffer zone around a clinic to prevent all uninvited approaches by pro-choice advocates, even
peaceful approaches, burdened free speech rights and was thus unconstitutional); Am. Life
League, Inc., 47 F.3d at 650 (noting that FACE does not prohibit peaceful protests); Lyle
Denniston, Judges May Keep Protests from Blocking Abortion Clinics, Supreme Court Rules,
BALT. SUN, July 1, 1994, at 3A (labeling the ability of pro-life activists to approach pregnant
women as "sidewalk counseling" by reporting that Madyen "indicated that judges may not stop
abortion foes from engaging in nonthreatening 'sidewalk counseling' fairly close to clinics, if
that does not keep patients from entering or leaving clinics").
87 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998).
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information known as the "Nuremberg Files."'88 The files contained personal
identifying information of doctors who performed abortions and photographs of
the doctors, as well as inflammatory language comparing the doctors to World
War II Nazi war criminals.89 In alleging violations under FACE and federal and
state racketeering statutes,90 Planned Parenthood claimed that the First
Amendment did not shelter ACLA's statements because they constituted "true
threats."91 Ultimately, on May 16, 2002, the Ninth Circuit held that several of
ACLA's acts constituted "a true threat." 92 Finding that ACLA knew that the
physicians would find a serious threat in the "wanted" posters, the Court
concluded that censoring these posters did not violate the First Amendment:
There is substantial evidence that these posters were prepared and disseminated
to intimidate physicians from providing reproductive health services. Thus,
ACLA was appropriately found liable for a true threat to intimidate under FACE.
Holding ACLA accountable for this conduct does not impinge on legitimate
protest or advocacy. Restraining it from continuing to threaten these physicians
burdens speech no more than necessary.93
88 Id. at 1187-88.
89 Id. (stating that the web page contained statements such as the following: ACLA "is
cooperating in collecting dossiers on abortionists in anticipation that one day we may be able to
hold them on trial for crimes against humanity"; that "[tihere certainly must be a special place
in hell for such unrepentant slaughterers of God's children"). Furthermore, the court noted that
"the [web] page bears drawings of what appear to be lines of dripping blood." Id. at 1188.
90 Id. at 1184.
91 Id. at 189-90 (summarizing that defendants argued that the Internet statements were
not true threats because they were facially non-threatening, while the plaintiffs urged that the
statements be examined under the objective speaker-based test that considered the statements in
light of the entire factual context, that is, the atmosphere of abortion violence). The district court
determined that, in the context in which the statements were made, the Internet statements were
actionable and not protected free speech. Id. at 1193-94; Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 1130, 1155-56 (D. Or. 1999) (issuing a permanent injunction against ACLA from
displaying the information on the Internet). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held
that ACLA's speech was protected and reversed the lower court holding. Planned Parenthood v.
ACLA, 244 F.3d 1007, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2000). The court also reversed a $107 million jury
verdict against the defendants. Id. Crucial to the Court of Appeals' decision was that the
statements were made in a public forum, that ACLA did not communicate privately with the
plaintiffs, and that it did not say anything about harming the doctors, nor called upon others to
do so. Id.
92 Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 290 F.3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
court was satisfied that use of several posters and "the individual plaintiffs' listing in the
Nuremberg Files constitute a true threat. In three prior incidents, a 'wanted'-type poster
identifying a specific doctor who provided abortion services was circulated, and the doctor
named on the poster was killed.").
93 Id.
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B. The Free Speech Debate in the Pro-Life License Plate Context
1. License Plates Are a Type of Speech
Because automobile license plates constitute "speech," First Amendment free
speech considerations apply to them.94 MoreovT, while a state may technically
own the physical license plates,95 courts treat plates as both state speech and
private speech, applying a First Amendment analysis.96
94 The Supreme Court has assumed automobile license plates do constitute speech. Nearly
twenty-five years ago, for example, the Court did not hesitate to apply First Amendment free
speech consideration to a dispute regarding the required display of a state motto on automobile
license plates. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-15 (1977) (presuming the message on
the license plate was speech by commencing its analysis of the motto with the proposition that
the First Amendment protects "both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all"). Subsequent to Wooley, lower courts have also presumed messages on
automobile license plates are a type of speech and applied First Amendment free speech
doctrine accordingly. See, e.g., Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1079-82 (8th Cir. 2001); Sons
of Confederate Veterans v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1101-05 (D. Md. 1997); Pruitt v.
Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414, 417-18 (E.D. Va. 1994). Moreover, because specialty license plates
are a smaller category under the larger umbrella of automobile license plates, specialty tags are
also speech included under the First Amendment. See also Jack Achiezer Guggenheim & Jed
M. Silversmith, Confederate License Plates at the Constitutional Crossroads: Vanity Plates,
Special Registration Organization Plates, Bumper Stickers, Viewpoints, Vulgarity, and the First
Amendment, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 563, 580 (2000) ("Specialty plates constitute speech because
the plate contains the extra dimension of an organization name and a symbolic logo.").
95 Most states expressly provide that an automobile license plate is state property or that a
license plate may only be issued by the state department of motor vehicles. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 8-132(a) (2000) ("[T]he division of vehicles shall furnish to every owner whose
vehicle shall be registered one license plate for such vehicle."); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 257.259(a) (2001) ("All license plates... shall be deemed to be the property of the state of
Michigan .... "); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-311(l) (2001) ("The Department of Motor Vehicles
shall furnish to every person whose motor vehicle is registered fully reflectorized license
plates .... "); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-63(a) (2000) ("Registration plates issued by the Division
under this Article shall be and remain the property of the State ... ."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-
04-11 (2001) ("All vehicle license plates issued by the department continue to be the property
of the State of North Dakota for the period for which the plates are valid."); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 585.080(2) (2000) ("All license plates... are at all times the property of the State of
Oregon."); S.C. CODE ANN. §56-3-1210 (Law. Co-op. 2001) ("[T]he Department, upon
registering and licensing a vehicle, shall issue to the owner one license plate.").96 See, e.g., Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. La. 2000), rev'd,
vacated, and remanded by 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the State had taken the
position that the pro-life message was its own); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb,
129 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943-44 (W.D. Va. 2001) (recognizing that there may be times a license
plate will represent state speech); see also Jacobs, supra note 36, at 441-43 (discussing the
ability of the government to "speak for itself' and the difficulty in determining whether speech
is government speech or private speech); infra Section [V regarding the confusion presented by
whether pro-life license plates appear to represent state speech.
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2. Hildreth v. Dickinson 97
In early 1998, both houses of the Florida Legislature passed a bill to create a
"Choose Life" license plate, with proceeds from the sale of the plates going to
organizations advocating adoption as an alternative for unwanted pregnancies.98
Although the Florida governor at the time, Lawton Chiles, subsequently vetoed
that bill, the next governor, Jeb Bush, signed it into law after it passed through
both houses again in 1999.99
In response to this statute, pro-choice plaintiffs filed suit against the State,
claiming that the pro-life license plate law violated the First Amendment's
Freedom of Speech clause.100 To establish this claim, plaintiffs first argued that
Florida created a limited public forum by authorizing organizations to propose
specialized license plates.' 0' Further, as a limited public forum, plaintiffs
contended that the State could regulate the content displayed on license plates, but
could not discriminate against certain viewpoints on that same subject.' 02 As a
result, plaintiffs concluded, viewpoint discrimination resulted when the State
permitted the pro-life viewpoint, but failed to offer a pro-choice perspective on a
license plate. 0 3
According to the court, however, plaintiffs failed to follow the statutory
framework to request their own pro-choice plate. 104 This failure to do so was
97 No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999).
98 Jacobs, supra note 36, at 427-28. State Senator Tom Lee sponsored this bill, which was
originally the "brainchild" of County Commissioner Randy Harris. Id. Prior to the passage of
this Florida bill, Harris founded Choose Life, Inc. to promote pro-life license plates. Id. at 427.
99 Id. at 428. Governor Bush promised during his campaign that he would support such
legislation if elected. Id. at 428. This bill creating the "Choose Life" specialty license plate was
codified at section 320.08058(30) of the Florida code: "The department shall develop a Choose
Life license plate as provided in this section. The word 'Florida' must appear at the bottom of
the plate, and the words 'Choose Life' must appear at the top of the plate." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 320.08058(30)(a) (West 2001).
100 Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *7-8.
101 Id. at *8.
102 Id.
103 Id. Although not expressly raised in Hildreth, Florida supporters of the "Choose Life"
license plate have argued that the plate does not convey an anti-abortion message. Jacobs, supra
note 36, at 429. Instead, the supporters insist, it is a pro-adoption plate that " 'has nothing to do
with a woman's right to choose an abortion.' " Id. This argument, however, is illusory for at
least three reasons: (1) a more direct pro-adoption phrase, "Choose Adoption," was rejected
several times by pro-life plate supporters; (2) anti-abortion groups such as Florida Right to Life
actively support Choose Life, Inc., the impetus behind the pro-choice license plate movement;
and (3) even pro-life defendants in a later, but similar, "Choose Life" lawsuit fairly conceded
that the plate was not viewpoint neutral on the abortion debate (that is, not merely an adoption
issue). See id.; Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. La. 2000).
104 Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *16.
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fatal, making their claim unripe for judicial determination. 10 5 Moreover, plaintiffs
did not establish how the statutory framework prevented them from speaking or
punished them for speaking. 10 6 They could have applied for their own plate and
were not compelled in any way to purchase the "Choose Life" plate and endorse a
view they opposed.' 07 Accordingly, the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because they did not demonstrate an actual or imminent injury. 10 8
Because the plaintiffs failed to present a justiciable case or controversy, their
motions were denied both to declare the "Choose Life" plate statute
unconstitutional and for an injunction to halt production of the plates.10 9
3. Henderson v. Stalder110
Nearly a year after Hildreth, pro-choice plaintiffs in Louisiana mounted a
similar free speech argument against a "Choose Life" license plate statute, l ' but
were initially more successful than their Florida counterparts. 112 In Henderson,
the plaintiffs maintained that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint by permitting only" 'the pro-life viewpoint to be expressed via
special license plates and pro-choice car owners are not given the option of
expressing their view on their license plate.' "113
105 Id.
106 Id. at *20. According to the court, Chapter 99-301, the chapter covering applications
for specialty license plates, "does not limit or regulate speech in any way... [It] grants an
opportunity for speech, but does not regulate it." Id. at *19.
107 Id. at *20.
108 Id. at *18-19, 21.
109 Id. at *21. Following this result in the Florida District Court, the National Right to Life
Committee, which supported the pro-life license plate movement started by Choose Life, Inc.,
posted on their website this message: "We can really start spreading the word about the
'Choose Life' license plates. We only have 46 more states to go." Lemer, supra note 1, at 48.
110 112 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. La. 2000), rev'd, vacated, and remanded by 287 F.3d 374
(5th Cir. 2002), vacated by, rehearing en banc denied by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 930 (5th Cir.
Jan. 9, 2003), cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 602 (2002).
111 The "Choose Life" license plate statute plaintiffs challenged was section 47:463.61 of
the Louisiana code. The statute provides that: "The license plate shall be of a color and design
selected by the Choose Life Advisory Council provided it is in compliance with R.S.
47:463(A)(3), and shall bear the legend 'Choose Life."' LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.61(A)
(West 2001). Both houses of the Louisiana legislature passed this bill unanimously. Jacobs,
supra note 36, at 432.
112 The Louisiana plaintiffs also argued, unsuccessfully, that the pro-life license plates
violated the Establishment Clause. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 593-95; see supra Part
II.B.I.
113 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
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The Henderson defendants 1 4 responded with three main arguments. First,
the defendants characterized the pro-life license plate as the State's own speech,
thus not constituting a forum under the First Amendment. 15 Next, as the Florida
defendants successfully alleged, because the pro-choice plaintiffs failed to apply
for their own plate, the dispute was not ripe. 1 6 Finally, the defendants asserted
that no statute prohibited the plaintiffs' pro-choice speech, again relying on a
winning Hildreth argument.117
After observing that most of the other sixty or so specialty plates did not
appear to be controversial, 118 the court noted that, regardless of the type of forum
created by the plates, 119 governmental regulation of the speech must be viewpoint
neutral. 120 The need for viewpoint neutrality was particularly important in the
context of these pro-life license plates when the State adopted one viewpoint as its
own because "[t]he right to an abortion is an extremely controversial issue and is
114 The Henderson defendants included the Secretary for the Department of Public Safety
and Corrections and the State Treasurer. Id. at 591.
115 Id. at 595. In addition, the State contended that it was permitted to express a preference
for normal childbirth over abortion. Id. By adopting this viewpoint as its own, the State "has
chosen license plates as a forum for speech. Once it makes this choice it cannot discriminate
against another viewpoint." Id. at 598. Indeed, the court later concluded that pro-choice
plaintiffs should not have to wait to express their views in this forum, "particularly in light of
the State's pointed espousal of the published opinion to 'Choose Life.' "Id. at 601.
116 Id. at 595.
117 Id. at 595-96.
118 Id. at 596. Types of available Louisiana specialty license plates include college and
university license plates, Girl Scouts, and "Don't Litter Louisiana." Id. "[F]or the most part the
organizations represented do not appear to be controversial." Id.
119 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 597-600. The court stated that because plaintiffs had
assumed that the plates constituted a nonpublic forum for purposes of the preliminary
injunction, the court would analyze it as such. Id. at 597.
The designation of the nature of the forum may sometimes be significant. See, e.g., Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1983). Typically, property is separated into three
different kinds of forums under a First Amendment analysis: the traditional public forum, the
designated public forum, and the non-public forum. See, e.g., Perry Ed. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45-
46; Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947-48 (W.D. Va. 2001). The first category, the traditional
public forum, generally includes streets and parks as areas that" 'have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' "Perry
Ed. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). The second
category, the designated public forum or limited public forum, is "public property which the
State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." Id. Finally, a non-
public forum includes other government property that has not been qualified as a public forum
by either tradition or designation. Id. at 46; Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
120 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 598. For a discussion of the meaning of viewpoint
neutrality, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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the focus of a national debate."' 12 1 On such a polemical issue, the court concluded,
it would probably unconstitutionally restrain free speech to provide through
legislation only one viewpoint. 122 This remained true even though the State did
not prohibit plaintiffs from creating their own plate.123 Indeed, "the very fact that
the defendants insist that this is a state 'message" will probably require the Court
to find" the statute unconstitutional upon trial of the merits.124
Next, the court rejected defendants' argument that plaintiffs were not
compelled to use a "Choose Life" plate when sixty other specialty plates were
available because this theory did not acknowledge that the State had already
adopted the pro-life message as its own. 125 It was enough, the court concluded,
that the plaintiffs were not legislatively authorized to use the license plate forum
for their pro-choice views and that only one point of view, the State's, existed in
that forum.126 In denying defendants' standing argument, the court maintained
that "[o]nce a forum has been created which allows viewpoint discrimination, it is
unconstitutional from the moment the discriminatory forum is created., 127
Finally, in determining whether to grant the injunction preventing production
of the "Choose Life" plates, the court found that the threatened constraint on free
speech "far outweighs the damage that would be imposed by not allowing the
publication of the license plates."'1 28 As a result, the district court enjoined
production of the pro-life plates in August 2000, with the pro-choice plaintiffs
succeeding where their Florida counter-parts had failed the previous year.129
121 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. The court also noted that there were generally three restrictions on government
speech: (I) the government may not grant access to public forums to those whose ideas it favors
and deny access to others; (2) it may not "monopolize the 'marketplace of ideas'," obscuring
private speech; and (3) it may not "compel persons to support candidates, parties ideologies
[sic] or causes they are against." Id. at 599 (citations omitted).
125 Id.
12 6 Id. 599-600.
127 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
123 Id. at 602.
129 Id. Louisiana may be the first state to recognize plaintiffs' viewpoint discrimination
argument against the "Choose Life" plates, but it may not be the last one to do so. Last
September, a pro-choice plaintiff (Planned Parenthood) in South Carolina filed suit alleging,
among other things, that the pro-life license plate statute impermissibly discriminated against its
pro-choice views. Amended Complaint para. 25, Planned Parenthood v. Rose (D.S.C. filed
Sept. 21, 2001) (No. 2-01-3571-23). Subsequently, in November 2001, a judge issued a
preliminary injunction barring the manufacturing and production of the "Choose Life" plates
until a decision on the merits is issued. Order at 6-7, Rose (D.S.C. filed Nov. 20, 2001) (No. 2-
01-3571-23). In deciding to grant this injunction, the court determined that if plaintiffs "are
ultimately successful on the merits, the failure to grant a preliminary injunction would have
worked an irreparable harm to Plaintiffs as they would have been unable to exercise their First
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On March 29, 2002, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
holding, finding that the pro-choice plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the "Choose Life" plate statute.130 According to the Fifth
Circuit, plaintiffs failed to establish standing under any of the following bases:
taxpayer standing, 131 individual standing, 132 and organizational standing.133 First,
the court rejected the individual plaintiffs argument that there was no similar pro-
choice plate to express her views on her car. 134 In denying plaintiffs argument,
the court noted that plaintiffs requested relief, a declaratory judgment that the
"Choose Life" statute was unconstitutional, would not redress her complained of
injury.135 As a result, no individual standing existed. 136
4. Women's Emergency Network v. Dickinson 37
The court deployed similar reasoning in Women's Emergency Network and
also determined that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the "Choose Life"
statute. 138 First, the court rejected the organization's claim that it was forced to
choose "between speech about abortion and eligibility to receive funds under the
Amendment right to express their pro-choice position on their vehicle license plates." Id. at 4-5.
The court further maintained that the pro-life defendants, on the other hand, would not suffer
any injury from the injunction. Id. at 5. In balancing these harms, the court concluded that the
injunction must be granted. Id. at 6-7. A decision on the merits of this case has not yet been
issued, but the order granting the injunction did refer to Henderson when considering free
speech injury, indicating perhaps an inclination or willingness to follow that decision in favor of
the pro-choice plaintiffs. Id. at 4.
130 Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 382 (5th Cir. 2002).
131 Id. at 379-81; see also infra Part II.B.1. (discussing the court's use of this basis as a
rejection of the Establishment Clause challenge).
132 Id. 381.
133 Id. at 381-82.
134 Id. at 381.
135 Id. A forceful dissent in another case, however, relied on a line of Supreme Court cases
that held that an excluded person or group had standing to challenge an under-inclusive statute.
Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (D.S.C. 2002) (citing Henderson fl). For
more discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
136 The court rejected organizational standing on the same basis, that granting the
requested relief (declaring the statute unconstitutional) would not address the injury complained
of by Planned Parenthood that it was ineligible for funds through the Choose Life Fund.
Henderson, 287 F.3d at 381-82.
137 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
138 Id. at 1313-15. Indeed, the court in Women's Emergency Network noted that the
statutory schemes in Florida and Louisiana were similar, making "the Henderson analysis...
highly persuasive for purposes of this [standing] discussion." Id. at 1313, n.3. The court's
analysis of taxpayer standing is not addressed here because it was addressed earlier in this note
under the Establishment Clause challenges. See infra Part II.B.2.
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Act."139 Because the court concluded that the statute did not prevent anyone from
speaking, and that plaintiff organization did not apply for its own pro-choice
plate, Women's Emergency Network could not demonstrate an injury in fact. 140
In addition, the court noted that even a favorable outcome would not provide the
organization with the opportunity to speak on this issue. 141 Consequently,
Women's Emergency Network lacked standing as an organization to challenge
the "Choose Life" statute. 142 The court further rejected the individual plaintiffs'
argument that they were injured because they were unable to purchase a pro-
choice plate to express their view on abortion. 143
IV. STATES CANNOT AUTHORIZE THE "CHOOSE LIFE"
SLOGAN ON AUTOMOBILE LICENSE PLATES
A. Pro-Life License Plates Are Unconstitutional Under the
Establishment Clause
1. "Choose Life" Is Not "Secularized" Religious Speech and
Therefore Violates the Establishment Clause
Both the Florida state court's decision dismissing NOW's challenge 144 and
South Carolina's Attorney General Charlie Cortdon 145 maintain that the words
"Choose Life" on automobile license plates do not violate the Establishment
Clause. This position, however, cannot withstand close scrutiny.
The phrase "Choose Life" is a Christian religious phrase,146 clearly taken
directly from the Bible and is a founding precept in many Christian religions-
139 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1313.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. In reaching this determination, the court relied heavily on Henderson. Id.
143 Women's Emergency Network, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
144 See supra Part II.C.
145 For Attorney General Condon's statements see, for example, Group Opposes "Choose
Life" Plates, supra note 12; Bruce Smith, Planned Parenthood Challenges State's New
"Choose Life" License Plates, STATE (Columbia), Sept. 4, 2001, at 1; Lawsuit Challenges S.C.
"Choose Life" Tags, UPI, Sept. 4, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File.
146 The phrase "Choose Life" is a direct religious quotation from the Bible's book of
Deuteronomy. See supra note 72. "Surely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion
cannot be gainsaid.. . ." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963). Phrases
drawn from a Christian text "demonstrate a particular affinity toward Christianity." ACLU v.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 727 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Verginis,
supra note 25, at 764.
In addition, the religious phrase "Choose Life" has been consistently associated with the
pro-life movement. Cf Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,787 (1994) (Scalia,
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such as the Roman Catholic Church and the Baptist Church-that base the right
to life on Bible scripture. 147 Attorney General Condon compared the right to
display this religious phrase "Choose Life" on a license plate to the government's
right to use religious phrases in other venues: "Just as the federal government can
constitutionally place the message 'In God We Trust' on its currency, the state of
South Carolina can place the message 'Choose Life' on its license plates." 148 The
United States Supreme Court, however, already considered this alleged
comparison between the physical placement of religious statements on currency
and automobile license plates and rejected the proposition that there is any
similarity concerning the tWo. 14 9 In particular, the Court noted that the religious
J., concuning in part and dissenting in part) ("On placards held by [abortion clinic] picketers
and by stationary protesters... the following slogans are visible... 'Choose Life: Abortion
Kills.' "); Children of the Rosary v. Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving a pro
life organization's proposed advertisement that included "CHOOSE LIFE!"); Planned
Parenthood v. Bell, 677 N.E.2d 204, 212 (Mass. 1997) (affirming an injunction against an
abortion clinic protester who wore the phrase "Choose Life" on her clothing during picketing);
Columbus v. Bricker, 723 N.E.2d 592, 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (noting that pro-life defendant
charged with violating a city ordinance constructed a "Choose Life" sign outside an abortion
clinic).
147 See, e.g., Letter of Pope John Paul II to All the World's Bishops on Combatting
Abortion and Euthanasia (May 19, 1991), http://www.cin.org/jp2ency/aboreuth.html (last
visited May 24, 2003). The Pope, the leader of the Roman Catholic Church, advised his
bishops:
[I]t seems more urgent than ever that we should forcefully reaffirm our common teaching,
based on sacred Scripture and tradition, with regard to the inviolability of innocent human
life.... The church intends not only to reaffirm the right to life-the violation of which is
an offense against the human person and against God the Creator and Father, the loving
source of all life-but she also intends to devote herself ever more fully to concrete
defense and promotion of this right.
Id.; see also Pastor Art Kohl, Abortion: Perhaps the Most Selfish Sin!?!, Faith Bible Baptist
Church, at http://www.fbbc.com/messageslAborfionisselfish.htm (last visited May 24, 2003).
Kohl, a Baptist pastor, wrote:
According to God's Word, the Bible, life begins BEFORE conception. Most argue today
whether it starts at conception or AFTER. The Bible says BEFORE! The Lord told
Jeremiah, "Before Iformed thee in the belly, I KNEW THEE. and before thou camest forth
out of the womb Isanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations".... Six
times in the book of Revelation it speaks of the Lord's "Book of Life." The names of those
written in that book were written BEFORE the foundation of the world! Not after their
physical birth, but before creation!
Id.
148 Smith, supra note 145, at 1.
149 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n.15 (1977):
It has been suggested that today's holding [that a state may not require its citizens to
display the state motto on their vehicle license plates] will be read as sanctioning the
obliteration of the national motto, "In God We Trust" from United States coins and
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phrase on currency is not on display to the public, unlike an automobile license
plate. 150
In addition to diverse locations of placement, the "Choose Life" slogan is
significantly different from other more recognizable religious phrases such as "In
God We Trust," "one nation, under God," and "God Save the United States and
this Honorable Court."' 151 Unlike "Choose Life," the latter well-known phrases
are "deeply embedded in various aspects of public life."' 152 The Supreme Court
has upheld the legitimacy of these "deeply embedded" historical phrases through
a "secularization" approach.153 This method :relies on "the proposition that
currency... [W]e note that currency, which is passed from hand to hand, differs in
significant respect from an automobile, which is readily associated with its operator.
Currency is generally carried in a purse or pocket and need not be displayed to the public.
Id.
150 Id.
151 Bell, supra note 24, at 1273 n.1 (noting these famous religious phrases and that "the
Supreme Court's sessions begin only after the Marshal has recited the opening chant containing
the language 'God Save the United States and this Honorable Court' ") (quoting LEONARD W.
LEvY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, at xiv (University of North Carolina 2d ed. 1994)). But
see Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), stay granted by 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12826 (finding that the words "under God" failed the endorsement test, the coercion
test, and part of the Lemon test, thus violating the Establishment Clause).
152 Bell, supra note 24, at 1276. For a brief discussion that the pro-life movement
(represented by the phrase "Choose Life") is not "deeply embedded in public life" because it is
a relatively new concept, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
153 Bell, supra note 24, 1292, 1298-307 (maintaining that historical religious expressions,
such as "God save this honorable Court," "In God We Trust," and "One Nation under God,"
are validated through the secularization rationale and without that rationale, the phrases would
violate the Establishment Clause under Lemon). "Secularization" asks "whether seemingly
religious practices and symbols are in fact religious, or whether history and collective
experience have purged them of their religious significance." Alexandra D. Furth, Comment,
Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique cf the Supreme Court's Secularization
Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579 (1998). If the religious symbols are in fact "purged ... of
their religious significance," secularization then "preserves the inclusion of symbols and
practices that many Americans understand as fundamental to American identity," such as the
Pledge of Allegiance and other national mottos. Id. at 579-80. For cases demonstrating the
Supreme Court's use of secularization, see, for example, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676
(1984) (noting that "In God We Trust" and the Pledge of Allegiance are permissible religious
references); and Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602--03 (1989) (distinguishing the Pledge of
Allegiance from other unconstitutional religious symbols).
While the use of secularization to validate religious symbols and phrases has been heavily
criticized, it is still employed by courts, as noted above. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 24, at 1305
(criticizing secularization for its inconsistent results and for its "disservice to both religion and
society"); Furth, supra, at 600 (noting that secularization "threatens the integrity of both religion
and government, and ultimately marginalizes nonadherents").
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religiousness is a contextual label" where "history, time, and culture somehow
diminish or erase the religious import" of the religious symbol or phrase.154
Unlike the familiar national phrases such as "In God We Trust," "Choose
Life," as a Christian religious symbol of the pro-life movement, is not void of
religious import and is not "fundamental to American identity."'1 55 Without
secularization, the religious phrase "Choose Life" fails. 156 Because the Court did
not similarly secularize the phrase "Choose Life,"157 it consequently violates the
Establishment Clause.158
154 Furth, supra note 153, at 593. Justice Brennan's belief, too, apparently coincided with
this interpretation of secularization, and that religious phrases could lose their religious
significance over time and through repetition. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). He also noted that the familiar historical religious phrases such as "In God We
Trust" are "uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public
occasions, or inspiring commitment to some national challenge." Id. at 717. Conversely, the
phrase "Choose Life" does not serve a secular purpose, but rather advances a religious
viewpoint.
155 Again, under secularization, the Supreme Court examines the tradition and use of a
phrase or symbol rather than the "'content of its meaning.'" Bell, supra note 24, at 1294
(quoting Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the
Establishment Clause, 79 IOWA L. REV. 35, 50 (1993)). Even if the content of the phrase
"Choose Life" were examined, however, it would still fail the tradition test. Justice Blackmun,
in recognizing a woman's right to choose an abortion, noted that anti-abortion laws (and thus
the pro-life movement and its "Choose Life" symbol) were not longstanding, and thus not
fundamental, in the United States: "It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive
criminal abortion laws [i.e., pro-life sentiment] in effect in a majority of States... [in 1973] are
of relatively recent vintage." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973). Indeed, he further
observed that the pro-life movement (signified by the "Choose Life" symbol) was not even a
significant part of American common law: "It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time
of adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion
was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes [in effect in 1973]." Id. at
140.
156 "In the absence of secularization, historical religious expressions would violate the
Lemon test, O'Connor's endorsement test, and Kennedy's coercion test." Bell, supra note 24, at
1298. See infra Part IV.3 for discussion of these latter two tests.
157 Of course, the pro-life movement could have chosen a different, non-religious phrase,
such as "Choose Adoption," to represent its cause that would not have run into this particular
Establishment Clause problem, but it refused to do so. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 36, at 429
(noting that "amendments to change the wording to 'Choose Adoption' were defeated several
times in the [Florida] legislature"); Alan Judd, "Choose Life" Slogan Endorsed for Tag,
LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Mar. 18, 1999, at B7 ("Critics tried, but failed, to get the
Transportation Committee [in Florida] to change the slogan on the tag to 'Adopt a Child.' ");
Othon, supra note 69 ("NOW Vice President Shiela Jaffe said the organization tried to get the
[Florida] Legislature to change the wording of the phrase to 'Choose Adoption,' but it was
rejected.").
158 Cf Bell, supra note 24, at 1298-302 (demonstrating how secularization is necessary to
preserve religious phrases).
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2. Henderson I's 159Flaw: Leaving the Door Open for Future Lemon
Establishment Clause Challenges, Based on Distribution, to Succeed
a. Henderson I's Reasoning Does Not Rest on a Sound Basis and
Is Vulnerable to Attack
Although the Henderson160 court maintained that the pro-life license plate
state statute served a valid secular purpose under Lemon,161 the court's reliance
on the Supreme Court precedent of Bowen v. Kendrick162 to justify this
conclusion is misplaced. In Bowen, the disputed statute, the Adolescent Family
Life Act ("AFLA"), provided funds to organizations researching and providing
services dealing with pre-marital adolescent pregnancy and sexual activity. 163
Indeed, the Bowen opinion itself emphasized, thr.ough citing extensive legislative
history and statutory language, that AFLA was aimed at teenagers and the special
problems related to teen sexuality and parent involvement. 164 The Bowen court,
therefore, obviously did not include in its analysis adult women dealing with
unintended pregnancies and consequently could not have articulated that statutes
dealing with adult women and pregnancy served a valid secular purpose.
Thus, the Henderson court, by failing to distinguish adult women and
adolescents, presumed that there was no distinction between the special needs and
problems facing sexually active teens and adult women.165 This presumption, that
159 "Henderson " refers to the district court's first decision at 112 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D.
La. 2000). Although the later decision at 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002) also rejected
Establishment Clause arguments as well as Free Speech arguments, the Fifth Circuit denied
those claims based on lack of standing. Id. at 379-82. Henderson 's analysis is addressed here
because other courts in future decisions may examine challenges yet to come in a similar
manner.
160 112 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. La. 2000).
161 Id. at 593-94.
162 487 U.S. 589 (1988). The Henderson court relied on Bowen to establish that the funds
generated from the pro-life license plates served a secular purpose, solving the dilemma of
unwanted pregnancies. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. at 594.
163 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593.
164 See, e.g., id. at 595 (noting that Congress was cognizant of"the problems of adolescent
premarital sexual relations, pregnancy, and parenthood"); id. at 596 (stating that AFLA "should
promote the involvement of parents"); id. at 597 n.3 (finding that AFLA may only refer to
abortion services "to a pregnant adolescent if such adolescent and the parents or guardians of
such adolescent request such referral"); id. at 598 ("AFLA has a valid secular purpose: the
prevention of social and economic injury caused by teenage pregnancy and premarital sexual
relations.") (emphasis added).
165 Organizations that advise the public on sexual health matters, such as Planned
Parenthood, recognize that teenagers face different issues and dilemmas about their sexuality
and sexual behavior, such as peer pressure, than adults do. Planned Parenthood, for example,
provides special advice and information for teenagers grappling with sexual issues, particularly
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minors and adults are similarly situated, is contrary to decades of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 166 This distinction is critical because, while addressing teen
peer pressure from other teens to have sex in order to be popular or fit in: "It may seem as
though everyone your age is having sex--especially intercourse. This can make you feel that
you should be, too." Teens: Sexual Health Series-How Do You Know When You're Ready
for Sex?, Planned Parenthood, at www.plannedparenthood.org/teens/ready4sex.html (last
visited May 24, 2003). In addition, the website presents parents with a guide on how to talk to
their teenage children about these unique pressures and dilemmas: "Many kids become
confused and may be pressured into sexual intercourse before they are ready. Too often sexual
abuse, sexually transmitted infections, and unwanted pregnancy shape their lives.... Often
afraid of being 'different,' teens are easy targets for peer pressure and bad advice." Teen: The
Facts of Life-A Guide for Teens and Their Families, Planned Parenthood, at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/teens/teentalk4.html (last visited May 24, 2003).
Moreover, even more conservative pro-life organizations recognize that teen sexuality is a
different issue than adult sexuality. Cf Homepage, Ariz. Right to.Life, at http://www.azrtl.org
(last visited May 24, 2003) (linking to Arizona Right to Life organization that advocates
targeting teens and youth groups to teach abstinence); http://www.care-net.org/ (last visited
May 24, 2002) (providing two separate links for women and teens regarding abortion).
166 For Supreme Court cases illustrating the recognition that minors occupy a special
place in the law and do not have the same capacity or maturity as adults, see, for example,
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (" 'Adolescents, particularly in the early and
middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than
adults.... [A]dolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-
range terms than adults.' ") (quoting the 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task
Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 171
n.10 (1987) ("[W]e decline to hold a young child as morally and criminally responsible for an
illegal act as we would hold an adult who committed the same act.... [T]he child's actions are
presumed not to reflect a mature capacity for choice.... "); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 115-16 (1982) ("Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors,
especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults."); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose
for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious
consequences. [These laws recognize] that... minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."); Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 709-710 (1977) (White, J., concurring)
(observing that, because minors face different and increased risks resulting from early sexual
activity than adults do, distinct considerations and restrictions should apply to the distribution of
contraception to minors); and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("[A]t least in some precisely delineated areas, a child.., is not possessed of that
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees.").
Finally, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that this lower level of maturity and
capacity in minors affects how to deal with unplanned pregnancies in adult women and teenage
girls. For example, the Court noted that parental notification laws regarding teen abortion "are
based on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their
parents and that children will often not realize that their parents have their best interests at heart.
We cannot adopt a parallel assumption about adult women." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (emphasis added).
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sexuality and unplanned teen pregnancies may be a secular state purpose, the
Court has not similarly deemed counseling adult women about their own
sexuality. By failing to establish a valid secular purpose, the pro-life license plates
fail under Lemon.
b. Future Plaintiffs May Succeed Under Different Factual Circumstances
Although the Henderson court refused to find an Establishment Clause
violation, it did leave the opportunity open for future pro-choice plaintiffs to
prevail under different factual circumstances. For example, the court concluded
that the lack of evidence demonstrating that the three organizations in the council
that help to distribute the license plate funds were religious organizations "cuts
against the plaintiffs at this procedural stage of the proceedings." 167 Plaintiffs are
now on notice that they must thoroughly investigate and present evidence
detailing the nature of the organizations involved, providing documentation such
as who founded the group, who contributes financially to it to ensure its
livelihood, whether key leaders are also religious leaders who have dominant
control over the group, among other things.168
3. The Survival of the Lemon Test is Very Unlikely and Pro-Choice
Plaintiffs Will Prevail Under Other Analyses
While the pro-life plates would fail under the Lemon inquiry, 169 future pro-
choice advocates would prevail, too, under an Establishment Clause attack, even
if the Supreme Court decides to abandon the rigid and difficult-to-meet Lemon
test altogether. This possibility is quite likely 170 given the frequent and consistent
167 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
168 In other words, if future plaintiffs could demonstrate that the organizations that help to
decide which groups are eligible to receive the funds are actually religious in nature, plaintiffs'
claims may survive. Indeed, ineligible pro-choice applicants have noticed the Henderson
court's invitation to present different factual circumstances that might yield a different result
than that in that case. In Florida, for example, The Women's Emergency Network and
Emergency Medical Assistance, Inc., filed suit in January 2002, alleging that the state allowed
religious organizations to distribute the funds, in violalion of the Establishment Clause. See
supra Part II.B.2; see also Gammon, supra note 15; Lawsuit Challenges Choose Life Car Tags,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 16, 2002, at 3B.
169 See supra Part IV.A.
170 For articles observing the fierce criticism of Lemon, the Court's haphazard application
of the test and its results, and suggestions for alternative Establishment Clause tests, see, for
example, Bila, supra note 24, at 1550-54, 1581-96; Kristin M. Engstrom, Comment,
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring of Lemon and the Search for a New Test, 27
PAC. L.J. 121, 126-31, 157-61 (1995); Graham, supra note 24, at 182-85; Kagan, supra note
24, 634-35, 645-50; Kilroy, supra note 35, at 708-13, 737-43; Daniel Parish, Comment,
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harsh criticism of Lemon by several former and current Supreme Court
Justices.171 Indeed, a few of the Supreme Court Justices presently serving have
formulated alternative tests to the one articulated in Lemon.172 Justice O'Connor,
for example, maintained that the endorsement test "captures the fundamental
requirement of the Establishment Clause."173 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand,
Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 255-63 (1994); and Petron,
supra note 34, at 1244-51 (2000).
171 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Experience proves that
the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a single
test."); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the Court's repeated attempts to overturn Lemon);
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court has frequently criticized the
Lemon test, calling into question the test's viability); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112
(1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Lemon test "has no basis in the history of
the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results");
Roehmer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment)
(criticizing Lemon that "[t]he threefold test of Lemon I imposes unnecessary, and, as I believe
today's plurality opinion demonstrates, superfluous tests for establishing 'when the State's
involvement with religion passes the peril point' for First Amendment purposes") (citation
omitted); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) ("I
am quite unreconciled to the Court's decision in Lemon.... I thought then, and I think now,
that the Court's conclusion there was not required by the First Amendment and is contrary to
the long-range interests of the country.").
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave... after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence .... Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting
Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's
heart ....
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
172 See, e.g., Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response to
William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REv. 551, 597, 602-03 (1998) (explaining O'Connor's
endorsement test); H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There Be Peaceful Co-
Existence of Religion with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 203, 276-79 (1999)
(observing the Court's recent use of the endorsement and coercion tests); Brian J. Serr, A Not-
So-Neutral "Neutrality": An Essay on the State of the Religion Clauses on the Brink of the
Third Millenium, 51 BAYLOR L. REv. 319, 333-35 (1999) (noting the endorsement and
coercion tests); Jeremy Speich, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe: Mapping the Future of
Student-Led, Student-Initiated Prayer in Public Schools, 65 ALB. L. REV. 271, 276-79 (2001)
(explaining the endorsement and coercion tests); Verginis, supra note 25, at 745-47 (discussing
O'Connor's and Kennedy's alternative tests).
173 Engstrom, supra note 170, at 137 (citing Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)).
When government communicates a meaning that one religion over another, or that religion
in general is preferable to secular notions, it effectively endorses religion .... [Thus,] [i]f a
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has advocated the coercion test as the standard 1:0 replace the Lemon inquiry.174
Under both the endorsement test and coercion test, however, the "Choose Life"
license plate would violate the Establishment Clause. 175
a. Analysis Under the Endorsement Test
In articulating the endorsement analysis, Justice O'Connor defined
"endorsement" to mean sending "a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."'1 76 Whether this message is conveyed is determined from an
"objective observer's" standpoint. 177 Finally, this test is essentially "a
combination of parts one and two of Lemon."'178
"Choose Life" license plate statutes fail under this test for two reasons. First,
delegating control of distribution of the funds generated by the pro-life plates to a
religious organization certainly "favors" that religion. In Women's Emergency
Network v. Dickinson,179 for example, the state of Florida delegated this
responsibility to a Roman Catholic organization: Catholic Charities. 180 This
entrustment gave Catholic Charities control of over half of a million dollars,181
permitting that religious group to determine which entities would receive the
State practice does not give the impression that the State is backing a certain religion or
religion in general, then the practice passes muster under the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 136, 141.
174 Id. at 139-40.
While decrying the use of a single test in this sensitive area, Justice Kennedy defined
two principles that limit the accommodation of religion: Government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise, and it may not give direct
benefits to religion under the guise of avoiding hostility towards religion.
Id. at 140.
175 See infra Parts IV.A.3.a, .b.
176 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For more cases
where Justice O'Connor discusses this test, see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 422-30
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); and Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623-32 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
177 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
178 Baugh, supra note 172, at 597. The first part of the Lemon test requires that the statute
or act have a secular legislative purpose and the second prong requires that its principal effect
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying
text.
179 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
180 Id. The Roman Catholic pro-life belief is founded on its reading of Bible scripture and
tradition. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
181 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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funds and which would not.182 This type of monetary power and discretion to
award funds conveys political status and unquestionably communicates to an
objective observer that this Christian religion, entrusted with such authority, is
favored.
Second, as discussed above, the religious phrase "Choose Life" is a direct
quotation from the Christian Bible.183 As courts have previously recognized,
phrases drawn from a Christian text "demonstrate a particular affinity toward
Christianity." 184 As a result, an objective observer would interpret this
demonstrated affinity as communicating the message that Christians are the
favored insiders, while non-Christians are not.185
b. Analysis Under the Coercion Test
Justice Kennedy's coercion test is a harder standard for pro-choice plaintiffs
because of its higher threshold that must be met before action will be found
unconstitutional.1 86 Under this test, the "[g]ovemment may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a
degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.'187 This "coercion" analysis focuses on the psychological impact on the
observer, rather than on the underlying intent of the practice or statute. 188
182 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. The courts in Women's Emergency
Network v. Dickinson, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2002), and Henderson v. Stalder,
287 F.3d 374, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2002), declined to find that the pro-choice plaintiffs had
standing. This note asserts, however, that despite those rulings, the very delegation of such
powerful monetary authority to any religious organization, such as Catholic Charities, even
without evidence that the organization has advanced its ideology through distribution, causes an
actual harm and confirms plaintiffs' standing to successfully allege an Establishment Clause
challenge.
183 See supra note 72.
184 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703,727 (6th Cir. 2000).
185 Indeed, the argument that both the delegation of authority to a Christian organization
and the Christian phrase "Choose Life" fail O'Connor's endorsement test is consistent with her
previous opinions. Cf Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 637 (1989) (finding under this test a
Christian nativity scene exhibited in a public courthouse violated the Establishment Clause).
186 Paul E. Salamanca, The Role of Religion in Public Life and Official Pressure to
Participate in Alcoholics Anonymous, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1093, 1143 (1997).
187 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (1989) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)). Justice Kennedy also applied the coercion test in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
188 Serr, supra note 172, at 334 (explaining also that "the psychological coercion felt by a
single member of the crowd would be enough to trump" everyone else's desires).
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In Lee, a Supreme Court majority applied Ihe coercion test189 to prayer at
public school graduations. 190 Attendance at graduation, although not mandatory
for a diploma, was not entirely voluntary either because most students would
want to attend this significant life event.191 Because the Court determined that the
students could not avoid participation in the prayer if they attended graduation,
they were "psychologically coerced."' 192 Ultimately, the inclusion of the prayer
violated the Establishment Clause because of the coercion and that the school
district managed the decision to include the prayer at graduation. 193
Just as students are not required to attend graduation to receive their high
school diplomas, individuals may not initially appear to be required to purchase a
"Choose Life" license plate. If an individual wishes to purchase an anti-abortion
or pro-adoption plate, however, "Choose Life" is the only alternative.
19 4
Significantly, this means that those people, whether non-Christian, agnostic, or
atheist, are "coerced" to express an anti-abortion view through a Christian lens
whether they wanted to or not.19 5 Finally, and similar to the Lee school district in
control of the decision to include prayer at graduation, the state decided in the
license plate context to include the abortion topic and reject secular phrases in
favor of the religious "Choose Life."'196 Accordingly, this coercion and control
resulting from the pro-life license plate statute violate the Establishment Clause
under the coercion test.
189 Despite applying the coercion test instead of adhering strictly to the Lemon test, the
Court stated it was not, in effect, overruling Lemon: "We can decide the case without
reconsidering the general constitutional framework by which public schools' efforts to
accommodate religion are measured. Thus we do not accept the invitation of petitioners and
amicus the United States to reconsider our decision" in Lemon. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
190 Id. at 580-87.
191 Id. at 595.
192 Id. at 593-95. Jennifer Carol Irby, Note, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe:
The Constitutional Complexities Associated with Student-Led Prayer, 23 CAMPBELL L. REV.
69, 74 (2000) (noting that the students at graduation were "psychologically coerced").
193 Lee, 505 U.S. at 588, 597, 599.
194 See supra note 37, indicating that Florida is the only state that has actually produced
and sold pro-life plates. Florida's plate reads "Choose Life." Moreover, an individual may have
an extra incentive to purchase this specialty plate rather than, for example, a bumper sticker to
express his or her abortion views. This incentive derives from the proceeds generated by the
sale of the plates that would ostensibly go to fund the adoption program. The same financial
benefit to a pro-adoption organization most likely would not result from the purchase of a pro-
adoption bumper sticker.
195 Displaying a "Choose Life" plate conveys a Biblical message, indicating that the
purchaser holds the anti-abortion stance as a result of a particular Christian religious belief.
196 For sources indicating that Louisiana halted production of the plate and the sale of the
Florida "Choose Life" plates, see supra notes 14, 22 and 36 and accompanying text.
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B. Viewpoint Discrimination: Pro-Life License Plate Statutes Are
Unconstitutional Under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause
In addition to violating the Establishment Clause, the "Choose Life" license
plate statutes are also unconstitutional under the First Amendment free speech
clause because they impermissibly engage in viewpoint discrimination. Unlike
the different analyses necessary in the Establishment Clause argument to
demonstrate a violation, however, the free speech infringement is, to some extent,
more direct.
1. Pro-Choice Plaintiffs Have Standing to Assert a Free Speech Claim
Similar to the pro-life defendants in Hildreth and both Henderson cases
described earlier, the defendants in Planned Parenthood v. Rose1 97 argued that
the pro-choice plaintiffs lacked standing because the plaintiffs could not show that
they suffered an injury that would be redressed by a decision in their favor.198
Unlike those two earlier cases, however, the Rose court determined that the
plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the "Choose Life" statute. 199
Rose's persuasive conclusion relies on established Supreme Court
precedent2°° that holds that "a person or group excluded from benefits conveyed
via an underinclusive [sic] statute has standing to challenge the statute on
constitutional grounds, even if the effect of striking down the statute is to deny the
benefit to the intended group and not to extend it to the plaintiffs."20 1 This
authoritative precedent maintains that a plaintiff may assert a facial challenge
even when the plaintiff had not applied for a license under the disputed statute.202
In addition, the cases holding that pro-choice plaintiffs lacked standing are
unpersuasive because they dismiss too lightly the threat of the deprivation of First
Amendment rights.203 The insidious danger of this loss of free speech is
197 236 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D.S.C. 2002).
198 Id. at 567.
199 Id. at 567-70.
200 In relying on this Supreme Court precedent, the Rose court also referred to the dissent
in Henderson II that also examined this precedent. Id. at 567-69.
201 Id. at 568.
202 Id. (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 (1988)).
The court also pointed to Fourth Circuit precedent that rejected arguments that plaintiffs lacked
standing because they did not take steps to "ensure" their standing. Id. at 569 (quoting Finlator
v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (4th Cir. 1990)).
203 Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70. In support of this assertion, Rose also cites Supreme
Court precedent that maintains that "[ijt is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor
but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of
discussion." Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 nlO (1992)
(quoting TI omhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)).
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substantial in the "Choose Life" context: the pro-choice "plaintiffs are injured by
the government's promotion of one side of the debate on the abortion rights issue
in a speech forum, coupled with the lack of opportunity to present their opposing
view." 204 As a result of this injury, and of Supreme Court precedent that an
excluded person or group may challenge an under-inclusive statute, pro-choice
plaintiffs have standing to challenge the "Choose Life" statutes.
2. "Choose Life" License Plates Are "A Clear Manifestation of
Viewpoint Discrimination "205
Regardless of the type of forum a license plate creates,206 "[d]iscrimination
against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional. '20 7
This means that when a state permits viewpoints on abortion to appear on license
plates, it "may not target the 'particular views taken by speakers on [that] subject,'
in an effort 'to discourage one viewpoint and advance another.' "208 Here, in the
cases challenging the "Choose Life" license plates, a license plate expressing an
alternative view on abortion is not available for pro-choice individuals to
204 Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (quoting Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Davis, J.,
dissenting)).
205 Id. at 572.
206 Authorities are very divided on what type of forum a specialty license plate creates.
One side argues that the plates establish a limited public forum (also known as the semi-public
or designated public forum). See, e.g., Katz v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. App. 3d 679,
685-86 (Cal. App. Ct. 1973); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d
941, 948 (W.D. Va. 2001). Others, however, maintain that the license plate establishes a
nonpublic forum. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp. .414,417 (E.D. Va. 1994); Henderson
v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 597-98 (E.D. La. 2000); Laurie D. Medley, Note, Frespch:
Vanity Plates and the First Amendment, 25 VT. L. REv. 879, 889-91 (2001). Yet a third group
of authorities distinguish between specialty and vanity license plates, asserting the former to be
limited public forums and the latter to be nonpublic forums. See, e.g., Guggenheim &
Silversmith, supra note 94, at 577-79.
This forum determination is significant, for example, in addressing the constitutionality of
content-based regulations. For example, those types of restrictions are only permitted in a
limited public forum if they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests.
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). On the other
hand, government regulations in nonpublic forums must only meet a reasonableness test to be
permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990).
The designation is not crucial in this section, however, because as stated above, viewpoint
neutrality is required regardless of the type of forum a specialty license plate creates.
207 Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
208 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Md.
1997) (quoting, in part, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29).
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purchase. 209 By only offering the anti-abortion position on a specialty license
plate, the state has assured, at least for some period of time, that only a pro-life
view may be communicated. Thus, through the availability of only one viewpoint,
the state advances the anti-abortion position while discouraging expression of the
pro-choice perspective, violating the free speech clause guarantees.
Moreover, a pro-choice individual's inability to exercise his or her
constitutional free speech rights for any amount of time, even if for a nominal
period, "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."210 Based on this premise,
"[t]hose who want to express another point of view should not have to wait a year
for the legislature to open the license plate forum" to a pro-choice plate.211 As a
result, arguments are misplaced that emphasize that pro-choice plaintiffs who
have failed to apply for their own plate though the legislative framework have not
suffered any injury.212
While cases like Hildreth, Henderson and Rose concerned plaintiffs in
Florida and Louisiana who did not file for their own pro-choice plate,213 there is
some evidence of viewpoint discrimination and other inherent problems when
pro-choice individuals in other states have attempted to do SO. 2 14 Despite the
standardized state requirements preceding approval of a specialty license plate,
pro-choice groups may have a more difficult time obtaining their pro-choice
plates, or might have to wait an even longer period of time before issuance of the
plates, than their anti-abortion counterparts because of legislator bias.215 In West
20 9 See, e.g., Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22503, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999); Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 591; Rose, 236 F. Supp.
2d at 567-68.
210 Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
211 Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 601. In addition, the South Carolina District Court
appiied the same injury reasoning when it declared that the statute permitting pro-life plates was
unconstitutional and that, as a result, "the [pro-choice] plaintiffs here have standing to mount a
facial challenge to the statute without having applied for the issuance of a license plate bearing a
slogan of their own choice." Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
212 The very availability of an anti-abortion plate, but not a pro-choice plate, creates the
injury. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
213 See, e.g., Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503 at *12; Henderson, 112 F. Sapp. 2d
at 595-96 (2000).
214 Indeed, individuals may challenge a policy under the First Amendment even "because
of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). The Henderson court's recognition of pro-choice
plaintiffs' speculative argument that there was no guarantee they would have obtained a plate in
the current pro-life political climate, even if they had followed the statutory framework
,exemplifies this. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
215 See also Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (discussing discretion allotted to legislators).
Legislators themselves may vote for or against a request for a specialty plate based on their own
personal beliefs on abortion or public pressure, rather than on whether all of the statutory
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Virginia, for example, when considering whether to include a "Choose Life"
specialty plate, "[t]he vote was nearly 3-to-1 in favor of creating plates for
abortion foes, and the same lopsided ratio against giving an equal right to the
other side."216 Thus, even applying for the plates does not even guarantee that
requirements were met or if a constitutional (First Amendment) violation would result. For
articles acknowledging legislator bias or legislative sentiment favoring pro-life views, see for
example, Jacobs, supra note 36, at 432 (noting that a "Choose Life" advocate recognized that
"[i]t's easy to get things done in Louisiana because we have a very pro-life legislature")
(internal citation omitted).
Favoritism for one side of the abortion debate may be the person or entity initiating or
encouraging the "Choose Life" plates. In some states that have passed this legislation, like
South Carolina, the idea for a "Choose Life" plate "was not the result of any formal petition by
anyone seeking the issuance of such a plate," rather it was promoted by Senator Michael L. Fair
"on his own initiative." Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
The potential for bias or favoritism to affect a government official's action on the abortion
subject when that official should remain neutral is further exemplified in the criticism directed
at Attorney General John Ashcroft and his ability to carry out his job fairly to protect
constitutional rights when confronted with abortion issues. (He has a well-known personal
position opposing the morality abortion.) See, e.g., Ashcrofl Must Support Clinics, CAPITAL
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at 14A; William Claibome, A Decade Later, Abortion Foes Again
Gather in Wichita, WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, at A3; Mary Jacoby, Bush Dedicates Justice
Building to Robert F Kennedy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at IA. Of course, the
potential for bias is even greater in a popularly elected state legislator than in the Attorney
General.
Finally, this impermissible legislative discretion in specialty plate applications may be
compared to permit systems that require registration before an individual may speak. A permit
system may be struck down as unconstitutional if the licensing authority has too much
discretion, because it would risk the government's granting permits to favored speech and
rejecting unpopular ones. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 926 (1997); Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 572. Bui see Medley, supra note 206, at 897-
901 (rejecting this comparison and that a challenge based on this premise would fail).
216 Gzedit, Tag Team License Plate Battle, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Feb. 2, 2002, at 4A.
An earlier attempt to include a "Pro-Choice" plate was also rejected. Sam Tranum, Anti-
Abortion Plate Bill Advances Proposal Creating New Vanity Plate Sent to Full House,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 30, 2002, at 4A. West Virginia is not the only state that has
passed "Choose Life" bills, but rejected pro-choice plates: South Carolina and Tennessee have
as well. See, e.g., Jack Elliott Jr., "Choose Life" Car Trag Survives While Pro-Choice Dies,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Mar. 7, 2002, at DS4 (stating that the "Choose Life" tag was passed
the Tennessee House by Ill to 6, but that "an attempt to create a pro-choice tag died in the
House Ways and Means Committee").
Furthermore, legislative manipulation, which may be inherent in a legislative process, also
adds to the delay of pro-choice bill or the success of a "Choose Life" bill. For example, in South
Carolina, "Choose Life" was first introduced as its own separate bill in the House. H.R. 3714,
Leg., Spec. Sess. (S.C. 2001). In the last few days of the legislative session, "Choose Life" was
added as an amendment to the popular bill sponsoring NASCAR specialty plates. See, e.g., All
Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 20, 2001). As a result, "Choose
Life" supporters apparently helped to pass their bill by merging it with popular race car
legislation.
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pro-choice plaintiffs will not suffer delay and irreparable First Amendment
injury.2 17
C. Subject Matter Exclusion: The Abortion Issue Should Not Be on
License Plates at All
Although states must be viewpoint neutral once a subject has entered a
forum,218 they are not completely forbidden to regulate on the basis of subject
matter.2 19 States therefore should choose not to permit any slogans, whether
"Choose Life" or something like "Protect Choice," on the abortion subject on
specialty license plates.220 First, this decision would square with precedent
Finally, the very structure of some states' legislative processes may provide opportunities
for accelerating approval of anti-abortion plates or delaying the requests for pro-choice plates.
For example, in Alabama a limited panel of legislators may approve a specialty plate without a
full vote of the legislature. See, e.g., Alabama Abortion Foes, supra note 9. Having an even
limited number of legislators vote on a pro-choice bill in an overwhelmingly pro-life legislature
only increases the likelihood of bias in favor of a "Choose Life" bill. See also, Jacobs, supra
note 36.
217 Moreover, other state statutes regarding abortion may conflict with or constrain a pro-
choice group's ability to express its abortion views on specialty license plates. For example,
some state statutes prohibit the use of any public funds to be used in any way for abortion or for
abortion as family planning; or they forbid sexual education or abortion counseling to minors,
especially in school settings that might be the only place teens would have access to such
information. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.815 (West 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:281(F), 40:1299.34.5 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-5-1185, 44-122-30(B) (Law.
Co-op. 2001). Therefore when Planned Parenthood, an organization that counsels for and
provides abortion services, petitions for a plate with the generated proceeds to go to groups that
offer such abortion services, legislators may deny its request by pointing to the previous
statutes.
Lastly, for a suggested solution to limit the overall problems of legislative bias in the
specialty plate approval process, see Jacobs, supra note 36, at 469-73.
218 See supra notes 68, 105 and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (differentiating between
regulation based on viewpoint and regulation based on subject matter); cf Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2001) (noting the lower court's distinction between
constitutional subject matter discrimination and unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination). But
see, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 36, at 465 (maintaining that subject matter discrimination is also
subjected to careful scrutiny); Howard M. Wasserman, Two Degrees of Speech Protection:
Free Speech Through the Prism of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 8 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 323, 340 (2000) (noting that subject matter discrimination restrictions must be narrowly
drawn).
220 Unlike under viewpoint discrimination, it may make a difference in the ability to
engage in subject matter discrimination whether a specialty license plate is characterized as a
limited public forum or a nonpublic forum: Such restrictions might be more tolerated in a
nonpublic forum. Mark W. Cordes, Politics, Religion, and the First Amendment, 50 DEPAUL L.
REv. 111, 158 (2000).
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allowing the state to limit political speech and advertising 221 and with precedent
somewhat limiting speech in the face of abortion violence.
222
Moreover, this suggestion is in agreement with the opinions of many state legislators who
oppose both groups' using specialty license plates as a medium to express abortion views. See,
e.g., Isabelle de Pommereau, A New Strategy in the Abortion Fight?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
May 8, 1998, at 4 (reporting that one Florida House member believed that "I don't think we
should be sanctioning political messages on Florida's license plates"); Judd, supra note 157
(noting that one Florida senator commented: "I just don't think a license tag is a proper place to
express a political view."); Mark Lane, Courts Might End Auto-Tag Proliferation, Cox NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 4, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File (reporting that former
Florida governor Lawton Chiles did not believe license plates were an appropriate forum for the
abortion debate).
221 Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding a city law that permitted
bus advertising except for political advertisements). Some assertions maintain that "Choose
Life" (i.e., an abortion message) is not political or is no more political than other specialty
license plates that are, for example, about the environment. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 2 (noting
that Louisiana's assistant attorney general argued that the "Sportsman's Paradise" plate that was
available might be just as political to "animal-rights folks"); Martel, supra note 9 (reporting that
one senator commented, "[t]he black bear plate is fine, but that's an environmentalists' versus
landowners' issue and you can't tell me that's not political. If we can save black bears, we can
save babies.")
Arguments that the abortion topic does not differ from an issue like the environment,
however, are fallacious. There is simply no comparison between "saving Louisiana's black
bear" and the abortion debate for at least two reasons. First, abortion in particular is identified as
a political party doctrine, with the Republican party generally adopting a pro-life stance. See,
e.g., Rebecca L. Andrews, Note, The Unconstitutionality of State Legislation Banning "Partial-
Birth "Abortion, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 521, 535 (1999) (noting how the Religious Right and the
Republican party have a joined agenda to outlaw abortion); Alec Whalen, Consensual Sex
Without Assuming the Risk of Carrying an Unwanted Fetus; Another Foundation for the Right
to an Abortion, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1997) (observing that the Republican party
platform still calls for an amendment to ban abortions).
Second, abortion has clearly been a political issue for decades, illustrating its importance in
the national political mind by acting as a litmus test for voters when it comes time to pick the
President of the United States. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court
Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1398-99 (2000) (noting that abortion was a major issue in
national politics); CNN Talkback Live (CNN television broadcast, July 25, 2000) (revealing one
guest's information of "a study of the 1992 election that Bush's father lost, which showed that
more than any single issue, bar none, abortion had the effect of swinging more voters"); Bruce
Ramsey, Messages in the Vote: Money, Lies, Social Security, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at
B12 (observing that "[a]bortion was another issue that decided millions of votes" in the Gore-
Bush election).
Thus, even though pro-life views on abortion may be expressed religiously as fundamental
to a religious faith, abortion itself is a very political topic. See, e.g., Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d
at 598.
222 See supra Part III.A. Moreover, in the context of automobiles, the abortion topic and
violence have already been linked. See, e.g., Acid Dumped at 5 Florida Abortion Sites, CHI.
TRD3., May 22, 1998, at 4 (noting that abortion clinic attacks came a day after former Florida
governor vetoed the "Choose Life" plates); Douglas Belkin, "Choose Life" Car Tags Stirring
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Second, if both sides of the issue were not permitted to present their views on
specialty plates, there would be no irreparable First Amendment injury. Indeed,
the primary function of a license plate is identification,223 not for spreading a
political (or religious) message. There is no harm in denying access to specialty
license tags because, even if individuals may not express their abortion
viewpoints on the plates, they may still paste bumper stickers on their automobile
to state their positions.224 Finally, the alternative use of bumper stickers would
also alleviate any concern about stifling discussion on the topic and the flow of
ideas.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the abortion debate has been a divisive topic for decades in other
contexts,225 that the "Choose Life" movement has used specialty license plates as
a context in which to send its message has generated even more controversy over
the last few years.226 Pro-choice advocates contested these license plates, alleging
Establishment Clause and free speech violations.227 In the cases decided to date,
these challenges have met with mixed success.228
As this note has examined, however, "Choose Life" license plates (both its
phrase and fund distribution method) do violate the Establishment Clause whether
the plates are examined under the Lemon test, 229 the endorsement test,230 or the
coercion test.231 In addition, the "Choose Life" statutes are also unconstitutional
up Debate over Anti-Abortion Efforts, CHATrANOOGA TIMEs, July 23, 2000, at Al 5 ('lhe
license plate is a clear and present danger to the people of Florida.... It has been the rallying
cry responsible for murders and vandalism, and it would give a green light to would-be
terrorists."); Diane Rado, Chiles Has 15 Days to Decide Abortion Bill, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 2, 1998, 4B (reporting "[w]hat beautiful timing" it was when clinic attacks coincided with
veto of pro-life plates).
223 "A vehicle license plate is a state-imposed display of registered vehicle identification.
That the state permits [some word and symbol combinations in specialty plates] is purely
incidental to the primary function of vehicle identification." Kahn v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added).
224 For sources maintaining that the use of bumper stickers is a good alternative to
expressing views on license plates, see, for example, id. at 11-12 and Guggenheim &
Silversmith, supra note 94, at 583-85. When both sides of an issue are not permitted to use a
license plate to express a view does not raise the same concerns of fairness as when only one
side's view has access to the forum.
225 See supra Part III.A.
226 See supra notes 9, 11 and accompanying text.
227 See supra Parts II, III.
228 See supra Parts II, III.
229 See supra Part IV.A.2.
230 See supra Part IV.A.3.a.
231 See supra Part IV.A.3.b.
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under the free speech clause because they impermissibly discriminate on the basis
of viewpoint.232
Finally, specialty license plates should display neither pro-choice nor pro-life
views.233 Banning this subject from the specialty license plate forum will not
cause irreparable constitutional injury,234 particularly in light of the availability of
bumper stickers, an alternative method to convey the same message.
235
232 See supra Part IV.B.
233 See supra Part IV.C.
234 See supra Part IV.C.
235 See supra Part IV.C.
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